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For more than 20 years Ford Foundation programs around the world have
supported community-based forestry in its many forms and facets. From
significant support for joint forest management in India, where communities
become the guardians of state-owned forests in exchange for limited sustain-
able use rights, to programs for improving community management of the 70
percent of Mexico’s forest lands that they control, and community involvement
in the low-impact restoration of federal forest lands in the United States,
community approaches to forestry have been a hallmark of Ford Foundation
work in many countries.
The Forest Trends analysis in this paper highlights the distinct sets of
actors who can become engaged in activities designed to improve tenure
security; they include activists and nongovernmantal organizations (NGOs),
public law groups, community development and training organizations, policy
groups, and government agencies. The range of actions that they undertake
include mapping and demarcating lands, mobilizing around their legalization,
bringing suits in support of the residents on the lands, lobbying for legislative
changes, and building the capacity of local groups to undertake many of
these activities.
Drawing from concrete experiences in nine countries, from Bolivia,
Colombia and Brazil, to India, Nepal, Indonesia, and the Philippines, as well
as South Africa and Tanzania, the study highlights critical “emerging issues”
in this field. They include the impacts of increasing decentralization of gover-
nance, the overlay of emerging democracy, conflict, and community-based
tenure, and the strengthening links between community stakeholders and
their global representatives. And the paper concludes with nine strategies
for advancing community tenure security, a veritable guidebook for communi-
ties and the organizations that seek to assist them.
Michael E. Conroy
former Senior Program Officer
FORD FOUNDATION – NEW YORK, JUNE 2003
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The world’s poor are disproportionately located 
in rural areas and [are] strongly dependent upon
forests for their survival. 
the enduring resources – indeed, the assets – that individuals, organizations,
or communities can acquire, develop, improve, and transfer across generations.
These assets include (2002, pp. 2-3):
• Human assets such as the education and other marketable skills that
allow low-income people to obtain and retain employment that pays a living
wage, as well as comprehensive reproductive health which affects the capacity
of people to work, overcome poverty, and lead satisfying lives;
• Financial holdings of low-income people, such as savings, homeowner-
ship, and equity in a business;
• Social bonds and community relations that constitute the social capital
and civic culture of a place and that can break down the isolation of the poor,
as well as the webs of interpersonal and intergenerational relationships that
individuals need as a base of security and support; and
• Natural resources, such as forests, wildlife, land, and livestock that can
underpin communities and provide sustainable livelihoods, as well as envi-
ronmental services such as a forest’s role in the cleansing, recycling, and
renewal of the air and water that sustain human life.
When this approach is applied to communities that are dependent upon
converting natural resources into sustainable livelihoods, it becomes a strategy
for building the natural assets of these communities. The theoretical bases for
building natural assets have been explored by Boyce (2001), Boyce and
Pastor (2001), and Boyce and Shelley (2003). Boyce and his co-authors note
that the application of asset-building strategies to natural assets is compelling
because “strategies for building natural assets in the hands of low-income
individuals and communities can simultaneously advance the goals of poverty
reduction, environmental protection and environmental justice” (2001, p. 268).
It countermands the conventional wisdom that the poor face an inescapable
tradeoff between higher incomes and a better environment. And building
natural assets can contribute not only increased income but also nonincome
benefits such as health and environmental quality. 
If, as this paper suggests, “the world’s poor are dispropor-
tionately located in rural areas and [are] strongly dependent upon forests
for their survival,” what do we know about strengthening the rights that
communities have over those forests? What relationship is that likely to
have with their ability to convert forests, as natural assets, into the bases for
sustainable livelihoods that alleviate poverty? And what have been the most
successful strategies used in recent years for strengthening community
tenure security with respect to forests?
These are some of the critical issues addressed by Forest Trends in this
informative paper. This is the second of a pair of papers on tenure issues
related to forest lands developed by Forest Trends at the invitation of the Ford
Foundation. The first, A Place in the World: Tenure Security and Community
Livelihoods, A Literature Review, by Lynn Ellsworth, draws upon more than
50 years of academic debate and the evolution of four distinct traditions of
land tenure analysis to highlight the theoretical discussions that lie behind
this fundamentally practice-oriented contribution. It was also published in
this series.
Why is this work of special importance to the Ford Foundation? Why
undertake this analysis at this point? What importance could it have for
other funders and development organizations? Those questions provide the
focus for this brief foreword.
For the past five years, much of the work of the Ford Foundation linked to
the alleviation of poverty and injustice has been organized conceptually
around an asset-building approach in which work at the level of local commu-
nities is an important facet. The asset-building approach to poverty alleviation
provides a significant departure from other paradigms that focused primarily
upon subsidy and transfer programs that temporarily raise the incomes, or the
consumption levels, of persons deemed to be poor, without affecting signifi-
cantly the determinants of that poverty (cf. Sherraden 1991; Oliver and
Shapiro 1995; and Ford Foundation 2002). The asset-building approach builds
Foreword By Michael Conroy
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By Michael Jenkins
An historic transition in global forest tenure is currently
under way. After years of government resistance, community claims
to forest ownership are finally gaining momentum and acknowledge-
ment. Many governments are beginning to recognize the ownership
claims of indigenous communities and others and to grant access to
lands usurped by colonial powers hundreds of years ago. Now that there
is growing opportunity to advance the community rights and forest
tenure reform agendas, it is necessary to identify the key strategies for
strengthening community tenure. It is equally important to capture
and disseminate lessons for practitioners, donors, forward-looking
governments and the communities themselves.
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Preface
In some countries this process of recognizing community rights is
well advanced. In Bolivia, the Philippines, Colombia and Canada,
for example, court decisions, presidential edicts, and new legislation
have in fact granted some communities very strong managerial rights
over forests, along with use of these lands. In some cases the rights
are strong enough to constitute full private ownership. In Russia and
many countries in Southeast Asia and Africa, however, the transition
toward recognizing and respecting community rights has just begun.
And in many countries that have passed new legislation, cumbersome
regulations, lack of enforcement and continued policy bias against
community property continue to be major barriers. 
In places where it is emerging, respect for community property
comes in response to decolonization as maturing nation states enter
the global economy and devolve control to a more local level. In this
process of devolution, local groups, NGOs and their supporters are
key. Their efforts have often been waged in direct confrontation with
governments. Nations and advocates of sound forest management are
recognizing that secure property rights are fundamental to achieve
forest conservation, social justice and poverty alleviation. It is increas-
ingly evident that in order to achieve tenure security, substantial legal
reform will be necessary. 
Local groups, NGOs and their supporters have employed a wide
variety of strategies to advance community rights and tenure reform
agendas, and these strategies in large part reflect the range of social
and political conditions in each country. Since these groups have
been relatively few in number, somewhat isolated within their own
country contexts and in possession of limited resources, the lessons
learned from them have not been carefully examined or widely
The process of recognizing 
community rights is well advanced
in some countries.
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shared. Most literature has focused on the role of international
NGOs or donors, without enough attention to the complementary
roles of local activists and outside catalysts or supporters.
This paper identifies the key strategies used by local groups and
NGOs to advance community tenure interests. It draws preliminary
lessons for practitioners and innovators. We pay particular attention
to the case of forests and community property, although the strategies
are largely applicable to other natural resources and can be used to
strengthen other types of tenure. A companion paper entitled “A
Place in the World: Tenure Security and Community Livelihoods: 
A Literature Review,” provides an historical review of the literature and
conversations concerning property rights. Both papers were prepared
at the invitation of the Ford Foundation, which has played an instru-
mental role in advancing the interests of forest communities in countries
around the world. The Ford Foundation, other donors active in the
field and the many local groups and NGOs supported by them have
dedicated themselves to leveraging structural changes in forest
tenure and community livelihoods with relatively scarce resources.
The two papers were written to help these actors make more
informed decisions regarding the utility and limitations of each strategy
and the conditions under which each is appropriate. 
While the Ford Foundation provided the support for this review,
the lessons and conclusions are pertinent to other foundations,
international aid agencies and governments. Indeed, for these activities
to reach some scale or coherence, increased collaboration and collective
action from the diverse actors will be critical. Donors like the Ford
Foundation have an unusual opportunity to expand this community
of practice.
The papers build upon and complement other initiatives and
research projects by Forest Trends. We have completed two related
reports: “Who Owns the World’s Forests? Forest Tenure and Public
Forests in Transition” and “Making Markets Work for Forest
Communities.” The first reviews the legal distribution of ownership
and access in the major forest countries, and the second explores the
real possibilities of enhancing community livelihoods through forest
markets. 
We hope that this series of products will help lay the foundation
for more targeted action and catalyze new and greater commitment
to these critical tenure and market issues. The time is ripe to build a
more robust community of forestry practitioners with a clearer sense
of common priorities. Genuine progress toward alleviating poverty
and conserving the world’s forests depends upon it.
Michael Jenkins
President
FOREST TRENDS
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Introduction: The Problem 
of Inadequate and Insecure
Community Property Rights
Over Community Forests
By Andy White
Tenure security has recently become a central concern for
advocates of poverty alleviation, forest conservation and human
rights alike. Poverty experts now recognize that the world’s poor are
disproportionately located in rural areas and strongly dependent
upon forest resources for their survival. Recent studies indicate that
about 80 percent of the extreme poor, those living on less than one
dollar a day, depend on forest resources for their livelihoods. One billion
people depend almost entirely on forests for their medicinal resources,
and about the same number depend on forests for their fuel needs.1
The poor are also directly dependent on the many ecosystem services
of forests, particularly on watershed services and biodiversity. 
More than 100 million indigenous people live in the world’s
forests. Without recognizing the rights of indigenous and other com-
munities—and enhancing the security of these rights—communities
cannot manage their resources as assets. And without full use of their
assets, communities cannot achieve their goals of ensuring cultural
vitality and economic development. 
The forest conservation community increasingly recognizes that
forest degradation is not due to local populations’ lack of interest in
protecting or managing resources. It is caused by the historic central-
ization of control over forest resources and the resulting problems of
enforcing property rights while enabling sustainable livelihoods.
Globally, communities in forested areas are more likely to suffer
inequities and be subject to conflicts as more powerful actors extract
forest resources.2 Without secure tenure, there are few incentives for
these communities to invest in forest stewardship or to risk taking
action to protect community assets. Forest conservation advocates
are also becoming aware that forest-based communities are increasingly
being reinstated as significant owners and managers of the world’s
forests and that this could dramatically affect the future supply of wood
products and biodiversity protection. The human rights community
is increasingly aware of the justice dimension of forest ownership and
its role in conflict reduction and poverty alleviation. It actively supports
the recognition of indigenous and other community rights as a global
priority through new national legislation and international treaties.
The problem of insecure forest tenure derives largely from the fact
that governments still officially claim the vast majority of the world’s
forests. This is a legacy of colonial and imperial times when govern-
ments legally usurped land from native dwellers and delegated authority
to forest agencies.3
Forest tenure remains a critical issue in many countries despite the
progress that has been made. Put simply, there are two global challenges.
First, in many areas of the world, communities do not have rights to
their ancestral lands and the resources upon which they depend. In
these cases, formal community property rights are nonexistent or
inadequate, but communities often continue to exercise their customary
property rights to some degree.4 Second, where communities do have
some rights, their rights are almost universally insecure. This situation
has long fanned popular discontent. Communities around the world
have resorted to road and mill blockades, destruction of forests, sabotage
and revolts to protest this injustice.
Historically, it has been NGOs, human rights groups and their
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respective donors who have taken the lead in assisting communities
in the quest to gain more secure property rights and reform forest
tenure. Governments and their multilateral and bilateral donors
have, by and large, maintained the view of forests as a national good.
They have focused on urban and agricultural areas as well as on
establishing public infrastructure for private individual property
rights.5 NGOs around the world employ a wide variety of strategies
to encourage governments to consider community rights and advocate
for policy change. These strategies are varied. They range from con-
fronting existing laws with legal activism to collaborating with govern-
ments in experiential tenure models, to making governments aware
of the practicality of devolving control as a means to achieve effi-
ciency, equity, and a sustainable flow of products and environmental
services. The knowledge and experience gained over recent years
regarding these strategies and the issues and impacts associated with
different property regimes are extensive. Unfortunately, this knowl-
edge has been shared only on a limited basis and the lessons are
learned from experience. Given the increasing openness of governments
to community property and forest tenure reform, there is an unprece-
dented opportunity to mobilize new and greater interest in addressing
these historic issues.
This paper provides a preliminary review of the key strategies that
NGOs and their supporters have used to strengthen community
tenure security for their natural resources, especially forests. We start
by discussing the current global status of forest tenure. We also present
a framework for understanding and assessing tenure security and its
meaning in the context of community property. We then describe
and evaluate the key strategies employed by advocates. We conclude
by assessing the implications of these lessons and experiences for
community property advocates, practitioners and donors. 
This analysis is based on a series of field visits to India, the
Philippines, South Africa, Indonesia and Brazil, where Forest Trends
staff met with Ford Foundation staff and representatives of organizations
active in advancing community rights. Additional cases from
Bolivia, Colombia, Nepal and Tanzania were reviewed. Summary
descriptions of key cases from each country are presented in
Annexes 1 – 9.
The Special Case 
of Forests, Communities 
and Tenure Security
By Andy White and Lynn Ellsworth
At least 7 percent, or some 246 million hectares, of the world’s
forests are now recognized as fully owned by indigenous and other
communities; and at least 4 percent, or some 131 million hectares,
have been legally set aside for these groups by governments. These
averages rise to at least 14 percent “owned” and 8 percent “set aside”
when only developing countries are included.6 While these numbers
The Special Case of Forests, Communities and Tenure Security
Globally, communities in forested areas are more
likely to suffer inequities and be subject to conflicts
as more powerful actors extract forest resources. 
may appear small, community ownership and access has approximately
doubled in the last 15 years. Communities own, or have primary access
to, a majority of forests in Papua New Guinea, Mexico and China;
they either own or access 10 million hectares or more in Brazil, the
U.S., Peru, Bolivia and India. It is also important to note that a far
greater percentage of the world’s forest is actively claimed and/or
managed by communities. Recent court cases and activism in
Indonesia, Canada and Malaysia—three of the top five wood-exporting
countries—are increasing communities’ ability to exercise their
rights as major forest holders.
Of the governments responding to the need for greater community
rights, several, including those of the Philippines, Panama, Mexico
and Colombia, have recognized community-based property rights as
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full corporate private ownership. Many other governments, including
those of India and Nepal, are several steps short of granting full private
property rights. They are devolving some management responsibility
to communities, but the governments are retaining their tenure over
community assets. Nonetheless, most practitioners agree that the
global trend is increasingly to devolve resource rights to poor people
for their greater access and use.7
Tenure security remains a critical issue in terms of devolving
management responsibilities without legal tenure reform.8 First,
devolution of management responsibilities is considered a positive
step, but it falls far short of full ownership, offering many fewer positive
incentives for long-term collective action. Second, devolution com-
monly results in competing ownership claims by varied stakeholders,
especially where a government retains legal ownership of the land
and forest. It is common that overlapping claims and governmental
failure to enforce the rules create an open-access situation—with a
consequent decline in forest quality. In those countries where govern-
ments have long recognized community ownership of extensive
tracts of forest, such as Mexico, local boundary disputes may persist
from faulty property delimitation. In other countries like Bolivia and
Peru, the problem is less about disputed boundaries and more about
the inability of communities to get governments to enforce and protect
legal claims. In such cases, forest communities have had informal rights
historically, and they are too politically marginal to maintain their
newly acquired formal rights. 
Forests present special problems to those who advocate for more
secure property rights for communities. By their very nature, forests
are used extensively by different users for very different products and
purposes. Some of their benefits are layered and complex, so it is hard
to pinpoint or even sort through ownership. Due to the seasonal
Tenure security remains a critical
issue in terms of devolving 
management responsibilities 
without legal tenure reform.
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variation in production, varying groups may have rights over the
same products at different times. Not all claimants may be locally
located residents at any given moment. Migratory pastoralists,
hunters, rubber tappers and prospectors all may have reasonable
claims to use or access a forest and the resources that lie within it.
Downstream water users may also claim rights in an effort to prevent
deforestation of watershed forests. 
In addition, national government or international interests may
lay claims on forests’ environmental services, recreational values or
subsoil minerals. New markets are emerging for things like the genetic
resources of the forest canopy, the carbon sequestration function of
trees, landscape beauty, water filtration, soil conservation and biodi-
versity protection. When the environmental services of forests are
added to the picture, the range of potential property rights claimants
increases considerably. 
A simple example can be seen in the forest above the small city
of Lampung in Sumatra, Indonesia. There, the quality of the water
supply depends on the quality of an upland forest. That forest has
long been zoned a protected area, but in fact since the 1940s it has
been an open-access resource for rice farmers who were brought to
the area as plantation workers. The workers created villages in the
foothills of the forest, and, as their numbers grew, the workers and
their farming families expanded their cultivation into the uplands.
This threatened the forest canopy and Lampung’s water supply.9 But
in such a situation, who has valid claims to the forest: the state, the
town of Lampung or the farmer-workers? This puzzling situation is
common and raises complex equity issues about who owns the right
to what. It also indicates that complicated deal making and informed
law enforcement are needed in order to solve competing claims to a
shrinking resource. Law, however, can create restrictions on private
property rights through easements, zoning, permit requirements and
other requirements. These restrictions enable the deals and otherwise
maintain the state’s interests in public goods. Private rights are rarely
unconditional.
A Framework 
for Assessing Tenure Security
By Andy White
The term “tenure security” is often understood differently by
different people. Similarly, the goal of tenure security is often assumed,
but it is not clearly, or commonly, understood. Part of the challenge 
of advancing community interests in tenure reform is adopting common
definitions and conceptions of the problem. This section suggests basic
definitions and describes the basic elements of tenure security. 
In its most basic form, the definition of tenure security is “a defensi-
ble claim to a particular place or thing.” This is also the definition of
a “property right.” The terms “tenure” and “property” are often used
interchangeably,10 while rights are generally associated with respon-
sibilities. These definitions illustrate that there are two basic com-
ponents to tenure security, the particular “bundle of rights” and the
matter of whether those rights are transferable, defensible or secure.
We will address each of these components below.
It is important to recognize that the concepts and the debates
over property rights have been framed in international discussions
and by modern national experts in largely Western terms, with Western
concepts of property rights dominating the legal frameworks in many
A Framework for Assessing Tenure Security
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countries, including in developing countries around the world. The
fact that these legal frameworks often conflict with local, ancestral
or customary rights is a major source of the tenure insecurity that
predominates today. In many, if not most, developing countries
today, individuals and groups operate within a context of “legal plural-
ism,” where the customary and formal rules often overlap, contradict
and occasionally coincide. The challenge of gaining and assuring
tenure security is, by and large, a challenge of rationalizing those differ-
ent sets of rules into law and enforcing that law. 
Rights of Ownership and Access
According to Western property concepts, property “rights” can be
broken down into rights of “ownership” and “access.” In terms of
ownership, there are two basic legal categories of property in use in
the world today: public and private.11
The public category is further divided into two subcategories:
lands administered by government entities and lands allocated to
communities or indigenous groups on a permanent or semipermanent
basis. In this latter subcategory, the government retains ownership
and the right to extinguish unilaterally the rights of local groups to
the entire parcel of land. Under this arrangement, local groups typically
are not able to sell or otherwise alienate the land.12 Although the dis-
tribution of rights between government and community is different
in almost every country, invariably governments retain some right of
access, withdrawal of resources, exclusion, and management.
Examples of this type include tracts of government lands “reserved”
for indigenous peoples in Brazil and the U.S.; the Joint Forest
Management (JFM) schemes of India; and areas covered by social
forestry leases and other instruments in Thailand, the Philippines
and Indonesia.13 The villages engaged in the JFM schemes of India,
for example, have far fewer rights than the villages with collective
rights in China.14
The private ownership category is also divided into two subcate-
gories: land owned by indigenous and other community groups and
land owned by private individuals and firms. Private ownership is
defined as rights that cannot be unilaterally extinguished by the
government without some form of due process and compensation.
“Owners” of private property typically have rights to access, alienate,
manage, withdraw resources and exclude outsiders. It is best represented
in countries with Western property traditions by “fee-simple” ownership.
Group ownership is simply private land owned by a group. It is often
inaccurately called “common” property, when communities usually
allocate private rights to households for agriculture and some
forestry, while keeping some forest under common management. The
group ownership category includes “community-based property
rights,” in which the state legally recognizes full community authority
to define and allocate property rights within its particular area of
ownership.15
These categories may appear academic, particularly the distinction
between private group rights and public “reserves,” but the distinctions
are important. Private rights are more secure because they are less
easily controlled or expropriated by the government. Communities
that hold private rights have more leverage when negotiating with
governments than those communities with long-term public use
rights. The importance of this distinction may become more apparent
as the importance of ecosystem services generated by forests grows.
Communities with private rights have much stronger claims to the
benefits of ecosystem services and other opportunities than communities
with rights to public lands.
Rights of “access” allow use of some resources rather than providing
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clear legal rights to dispose of them.16 They are, thus, secondary to
ownership rights in terms of legal authority. They are defined by terms
that are either imposed by the owner or negotiated between the owner
and the individual or group desiring use of the property. Rights of
access include use rights defined in spatial or temporal terms. 
Elements of Community Tenure Security
Community tenure security can be defined as the confluence of factors
that allow a community to make decisions as if its rights of ownership or
access are secure and cannot be taken away arbitrarily.17 In this paper we
are considering tenure that falls within the two “community” categories
of rights described above—those public lands and resources set aside
for communities and those private lands recognized as owned by
communities. The issues associated with attaining security for com-
munities with these rights will be similar to those faced by individuals
and firms with private land rights, but will differ significantly because of
the community dimension. 
Some of the characteristics and indicators of tenure security are
listed in the box on this page. Although the definition and charac-
teristics of tenure security help explain community tenure security,
they do not necessarily help understand how to achieve it. Put simply,
the key elements or building blocks needed to achieve community
tenure security include: effective internal institutions of the communi-
ty, legal recognition and support of community rights, the presence
of independent judicial arbitration systems, effective regulatory
mechanisms and institutions, and a supporting political constituency
(see Figure 1). 
The relative importance of these elements will vary from place to
place, and only one of them—effective internal institutions—is nec-
essary. As illustrated in Figure 1, these elements connect the property
1. Security requires that there be 
clarity as to what the rights are.
Confusion as to one’s rights can 
significantly undermine the effective-
ness and enthusiasm with which
those rights are exercised.
2. Security requires certainty that
rights cannot be taken away or
changed unilaterally and unfairly.
In almost any situation, of course,
there are circumstances where rights
can be taken away or diminished, but
conditions for doing so need to be fair
and clearly spelled out; the proce-
dures for doing so need to be fair and
transparent; and the issue of compen-
sation needs to be addressed.
3. Security is enhanced if the duration
of rights is either in perpetuity or for
a period that is clearly spelled out
and is long enough for the benefits 
of participation to be fully realized. 
If rights are to be in force only for a
particular period of time – as in some
co-management arrangements or
community forestry leases, for exam-
ple – care should be taken to ensure
that agreements are made for at least
as long as realistically required to reap
the benefits of participation.
4. Security means that rights need 
to be enforceable against the state
(including local government institu-
tions) – that is, the legal system has
to recognize an obligation on the part
of the state to respect those rights.
5. Security requires that the rights be
exclusive. The holders of rights need 
to be able to exclude or control the
access of outsiders to the resource
over which they have “rights.”
6. A corollary to exclusivity is that there
must be certainty both about the
boundaries of the resources to which
the rights apply and about who is
entitled to claim membership in the
group.
7. Another corollary to exclusivity where
co-management concerns govern-
ment land is that the government
entity entering into the agreement
must have clear authority to do so.
An agreement should reflect only
promises on the part of government
that the responsible authority is
empowered to fulfill.
8. Security requires that the law recog-
nize the holder of the rights. That is,
the law should provide a way for the
holder of the rights to acquire a legal
personality, with the capacity to take
a wide range of steps, such as 
applying for credits, subsidies, 
entering into contracts with outsiders,
collecting fees, etc.
9. Finally, and perhaps most daunting,
security requires accessible, afford-
able and fair avenues for seeking
protection of the rights, for solving
disputes and for appealing decisions
of government officials.
Source: J.M. Lindsay, 1998.”Creating Legal Space for
Community-Based Management: Principles and Dilemmas” 
Characteristics of Secure Community Tenure
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rights officially held by communities to the relative security of those
rights. They are all important. However, tenure will remain secure
even if several elements are absent, so long as internal institutions
are in place. The importance of the other elements will depend on a
number of factors, including the degree to which the government is
generally and sincerely supportive of community rights and the
degree to which the community interacts with modern economic
and financial systems. It is important to recognize that tenure and
tenure security are social and political constructs. As such, the precise
meaning of tenure and the conditions that make it secure will be
completely dependent on local context. 
Effective Internal Institutions 
Community tenure security is strongly influenced by a community’s
capacity to define and implement its own rules. Communities define
their own tenure systems and develop their own mechanisms to
monitor and sanction compliance with those rules. These internal
institutions are often consensus-based and guided by assemblies that
represent households; they may also be dominated by local chiefs or
specialized subcommittees of elders or forest users. Historically, this
tradition was widespread before the rise of nation states and internal
governance systems and continues to function wherever communities
retain collective rights over resources in the world today. In some
cases, these institutions create agreements between neighboring
communities for common rules on managing wildlife, watersheds or
inter-island waters.
As the many scholars and practitioners who have studied so-called
“common property” have observed, success is indicated by the degree
to which community rules and resource boundaries are accepted as
legitimate, are clear cut and enforced, and by whether communities
Figure 1:
Elements of Community 
Tenure Security
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can practice exclusion, adapt to new situations and deal effectively
with external forces, particularly the government.18 To a large extent,
local institutions’ effectiveness can be measured by their effectiveness
in handling internal disputes: disputes over whom to exclude, disputes
over who gets to make the rules, disputes over resource management
rules, and disputes regarding interaction with the government and
outsiders.19
Where these customary systems interact with formal state systems,
security is affected by the degree to which a community acts in a
coherent and organized manner and by the degree to which the state
recognizes the legitimacy of local rules and enforcement. For example,
community success in the Indian JFM schemes is influenced by com-
munities’ ability to exclude outsiders and ensure internal policing with
support from the state forest agency. 
Legal Recognition and Support
Although many community property systems have existed for centuries
relatively independently or even in contradiction to state law, today
there are almost no communities sufficiently remote or sufficiently
powerful to establish their customary claims without formal legitimacy
or protection.20 For this reason communities often need to modify, or
else fit into, state and international treaty law to protect their interests.
Local communities alone, for example, cannot define the rules under
which they interact with outsiders, nor can they define the limits of state
power. In the context of property, it is necessary for state law to recog-
nize local ownership and access rights and to identify those with rights
to speak for communities. Nonetheless, tenure is a necessary but
insufficient condition for good forest management, as illustrated by
the case of Papua New Guinea, where clear legal recognition of com-
munity customary property rights is no guarantee of good forest man-
Community Property Rights 
as a First Step: Papua New Guinea
In Papua New Guinea, 97 percent of land is held under 
customary ownership and most of that land is forested. While the the
nation’s constitution lays the groundwork for communities (“landowners”)
to benefit from forest resources, the legal framework does not establish
processes for how people will benefit or who really represents the commu-
nity’s interests in negotiations with logging companies. In Papua New
Guinea, the dominant pattern is for communities to sell off mining and
timber rights to the highest (or only) bidder, who then extracts the
resources in an unsustainable manner. Communities do not have the
political power to effectively monitor and fine logging companies that do
not follow the prescribed logging procedures, thus damaging waterways.
Many analysts claim that most forest communities in Papua New Guinea
hope to strike it big with a short-term deal with a big foreign timber 
or mining company. Environmentalists have found that selling a more 
sustainable model of development to Papua New Guineans has been 
a difficult uphill task. Corruption is a significant problem at all levels 
of government. Even local leaders strike deals on their own without much
or any community discussion (McCallum and Sekhran, 1997). Massive and
substantive de jure changes in the larger policy framework have had little
impact on this situation (Mayers and Bass, 2001). 
–Lynn Ellsworth
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agement (see the box on page 13). Legal frameworks should be
designed as enabling tools. With regard to community property, laws
should recognize ownership, but then reflect customary rules and pro-
vide legal space for locally defined regimes within that ownership.21 It is
also important that legal frameworks give equal support to private com-
munity rights and private individual property, a “leveled playing field,”
so to speak. Unfortunately, there is simply no such legal framework sup-
porting community property in most countries, and where new legal
frameworks ignore local property traditions and rights—as in the case
of the Dawes Act of 1887 in the U.S.—the consequences are usually
disastrous (see the box on this page).
Regulations, Regulatory Mechanisms 
and Institutions
Official manifestations of rights, such as property surveys and titles,
can enhance tenure security and are increasingly important for com-
munities that are engaged in modern markets and formal financial
systems. For example, property titles are often required to gain access
to credit. Nonetheless, these manifestations are only as meaningful as
the real value afforded them by the key social and political actors.
Formal adjudication and title registry are a tricky business. Where this
process has taken place in the absence of understanding complex natu-
ral resources or in the presence of competing claims, well-intentioned
surveys and titles have not only failed to deliver tenure security, they
actually have increased the levels of conflict.22
Even when a law or policy is in place that establishes community
tenure rights, the processes for acquiring the official documents and
exercising those rights are often extremely cumbersome and bureau-
cratic. The political forces opposed to community rights often have
sufficient political clout to create administrative procedures and
The U.S. Dawes Act: 
Imposition of Individual Over Group Rights
on Native American Reservations
By 1887, most Native Americans had been grouped into marginal
lands called reservations. Some reservation land was still managed locally
under an indigenous commons property system. Much of this land was 
also forested. Also by 1887, western expansion of immigrant homesteaders
was raising demand for land and timber. Back east, reformers concerned
about the fate of Native Americans proposed to assimilate them into the
wider society. They argued that the best approach for doing so was to make
out of the often nomadic Native Americans a small-scale peasantry that
lived on individualized parcels of land (just like an immigrant homesteader).
Reformers who shared this view allied with local economic interests in the
West to pass the Dawes Severalty Act of 1887. It divided the reservations
into 160-acre allotments for individual tribal members. It stated that after 
25 years, certified “competent” allotment holders would be allowed to sell
their allotments to anyone. The plan was a fantasy and implementation
was poor. Swindling on a massive scale resulted. Consequently, by 1934
when the “New Deal for Indians” announced massive policy changes,
Native American tribes had lost two-thirds of their reservation lands
because of the Dawes Act. The success of this Act in assimilating 
Native Americans is widely contested by historians, some of whom
describe it as a misguided piece of legislation that resulted 
in poverty for Native Americans. 
–Lynn Ellsworth
Sources: Dawes Act, 1887; Miller, 2000; Weisberger, 1999; Pisani, 2001.
Deeper Roots 15
bureaucratic hoops that make it almost impossible for communities to
obtain them. For example, in Tanzania, only one small community
forest has actually been gazetted officially as of 1999 despite the pub-
licity about Tanzania’s progress toward community rights over forests.23
In that country, the bureaucratic processes necessary to gazette a
community forest are almost impossible to complete. Similar situations
exist in Bolivia and in ancestral domains in the Philippines.24
Furthermore, changes in law and regulations can undermine existing
collection tenure systems, as in Mexico where changes to Article 27 of
the constitution have made indigenous communities more vulnerable to
administrative manipulation that could undermine their tenure rights.
Government agencies enable indigenous communities (comunidades) to
become ejidos (where village collections include permanent, private
agricultural and house plots) in order to access benefits to government
loans and subsidy programs. According to regulations for implementing
that program, community leaders may make the change without con-
sulting a full village assembly, and the community can be unaware of the
impact of this change on local sovereignty and on collective access to
forest and pasture tenure security. 
Independent Arbitration or Judiciary Means
Another key building block of security can be the presence of an inde-
pendent third party to sift through local claims for various products and
resources. This can be a legal system of customary justice, independent
courts, a once-removed arm of local government, or an independent
arbitrator of some kind. The independent third party must have the
skill to come up with locally acceptable solutions to disputes, and
decisions must be accepted as legitimate by the state. The arbitrator also
must be relatively incorruptible so that people have faith in the system
and use it. Further, the system should not be weighted to favor the
Arbitration Success in Ukraine 
and Failure in New Mexico
The Carpathian mountain region of Ukraine is filled with
churches, many of great architectural beauty. Many communities sought
to revive their churches and make use of them again after the collapse
of communism. Unfortunately, the issue of who owned the churches and
the land around them was far from clear. Communism and its fall created a
welter of competing claims to the land and buildings. This frequently resulted
in destruction of church property and other forms of localized protest. A
group of academics from various disciplines at the local university banded
together into an association and traveled the countryside at the request 
of communities to research and adjudicate on the competing claims. 
They were supported by a small grant from a local foundation. Their 
independent and fair-minded approach was very successful. Dozens 
of property rights claims were resolved, and many churches were 
preserved in the process (Ellsworth, 1998). 
A less positive case of adjudication can be found in New Mexico 
(U.S.) in the 1850s. When its northern region was annexed to the United
States, the indigenous common property regime of the grazing hills was
ignored. The land became public property, and the government began 
allocating it to private individuals. This resulted in an uproar of contested
property rights. Adjudication commissions were established to resolve the
claims. But according to many historians, “corrupt government officials,
including judges, sided with rings of unscrupulous lawyers,” all of whom
used the adjudication process to bilk the locals of all property rights, 
creating resentment that lasts to this day (Knowlton, 1972). 
–Lynn Ellsworth
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“haves” and politically connected entities rather than the “have-nots”
and powerless groups. Examples of successful and unsuccessful adju-
dication are presented in the box on page 15. 
Political Constituency for Community Rights 
Communities often cannot defend their interests alone, particularly
when most governments historically have refused to acknowledge
their claims. Additional legal, policy and administrative assistance is
usually necessary, even if legal recognition has been secured and lands
have been demarcated and registered. Local communities and their
advocates need a sophisticated understanding of law and the political
landscape, along with the ability to lobby and otherwise effectively
defend their rights. Peaceful but intense negotiation is one of many
strategies that have been used with success in Canada and the U.S. by
Native Americans seeking reclaiming of property.25 In many other
countries, political action is more effective than legal action due to the
lack of rule of law and to inadequate justice systems. Legal action, in
these cases, is an essential part of a broader political action strategy.
A political constituency for defending and advancing community
interests can include communities, NGOs, religious institutions,
associations, unions, and other private sector actors. These coalitions
are most effective when all actors work toward a common goal, are
careful to keep communities informed, seek guidance from community
leadership, and otherwise hold themselves accountable to communities.
Political coalitions can benefit from the advice and cooperation of
interested individuals who cannot be an active part of a coalition, such
as people who work within the government bureaucracy or political
parties. Strategic actions undertaken by national and international
supporters can also strengthen the political power of the constituency.
Strategies to Strengthen
Community Tenure
By Lynn Ellsworth
In this section we describe a number of strategies that have been used
with success by NGOs and community-based organizations supported by
the Ford Foundation or other advocates for community tenure. Each
strategy is described and an illustration is provided. Where applicable
we also describe lessons learned.
While all the strategies described here can be useful depending on
the context, no single strategy will create all of the elements of
tenure security described above. Most of the strategies work best in
combination with each other, not in isolation. Also, every strategy
has multiple effects and may create new winners and losers, many of
whom cannot be predicted in advance. 
The effectiveness of a particular set of strategies also depends on
the broader political context and the immediate political moment in
which the strategic action is taken. Control over decisions about who
has access to land and natural resources is a source of political power.
Changing that control will of course then create changes in the
political landscape. 
STRATEGY 1: 
Supporting Legal Activism
Public interest lawyers can sometimes use existing laws to support
community claims to natural resources, including forests. They can
test cases in court, challenge previous court decisions, provide the
legal expertise to write new laws and fully use the alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms that exist in many countries. Activist-oriented
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public interest lawyers have been key players behind legal actions to
provide communities with tenure security in Australia, Canada, the
U.S. and the Philippines. In all of these cases, the communities in
question are indigenous communities whose traditional land rights
were ignored, diminished or abrogated by government until allies
were found to help fight their cause in court.
As the Philippines case shows (Annex 4), public interest legal
activism can help improve tenure security. The Philippines’ Indigenous
People’s Property Rights Act, drafted with assistance of public interest
lawyers and NGOs, was promoted in the Phillipine Congress for
nearly a decade and finally passed in 1997.26 Legal assistance played
a critical role after the law was passed. It provided support for the
Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the law after mining interests
challenged the Act as unconstitutional. While the Act is not regarded
in the Philippines as the perfect tool for providing security of tenure,
many think it is a considerable improvement over the prior situation
and constitutes a victory for supporters of community tenure.
In the past decade, both the Ford Foundation and the John D.
and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation have supported U.S.-based
organizations such as the Center for International Environmental
Law (CIEL), the Environmental Law Institute (ELI) and the
Environmental Law Alliance Worldwide (E-Law). This support has
enabled CIEL to help make the international environmental policy
arena better reflect the needs of high-biodiversity countries. ELI has
provided training for policy makers on legal issues pertaining to bio-
diversity. E-Law has maintained an extensive network of grassroots
attorneys in developing countries. Most national environmental law
groups are also human rights advocates, bringing cases regarding con-
stitutional provisions about environmental rights, development
schemes that damage local peoples’ livelihoods, and the traditional
land claims of indigenous people who have been disregarded by
national governments. The Ford Foundation and the MacArthur
Foundation have also supported national organizations such as the
Mexican Center for Environmental Law, the Peruvian Society for
Environmental Law, the African Center for Technology Studies and
Fundepublico in Colombia, among others. These organizations
exchange information to provide credible and politically sensitive
advice for tropical country governments and to improve independent
monitoring and critique of multilateral development institutions such
as the World Bank. 
One of the limits to supporting legal activism is the expense it can
pose in many countries, especially if prospects of victory are slim.27
Also, in developing countries, the infrastructure of public interest law
is often weak, and activist lawyers willing to work with marginal
communities are few. In fact, in many countries, the entire legal
activist tradition may be unknown. Corruption is often another
problem. In such cases, it may be necessary to build the organizational
basis for this approach by financing training, salaries and the costs of
specific legal casework, as well as by supporting judicial reform and
anticorruption measures within the larger society.28 Training and case
mentorship for would-be public interest lawyers and judges may also
be useful. Such activities also can be important to build and strengthen
networks of lawyers interested in tenure security. This kind of support to
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Public interest lawyers can sometimes use existing
laws to support community claims to natural
resources, including forests.
the public interest law sector is beginning to bear fruit in countries like
South Africa, Zimbabwe, India and Indonesia.
Lessons:
• Winning court cases and getting support for new legislation can
take many years. Hence, a ten-year horizon of financial support 
is realistic.
• The opportunity for legal change is often accelerated when 
bigger changes take place in the country, such as a transition 
from a nondemocratic system to a more democratic one, new 
elections or a cabinet shuffle.
• Success can be the result of a multistranded approach that 
supports many actors and many players over a long time, 
using many of the other strategies reviewed here.
• After testing the application of a new law or legal precedent, 
there is usually a new set of “next generation” legal issues to
work on.
• Legal victory in a specific case may not be enough to provide
complete tenure security. Larger changes in the policy 
and organizational landscape may be needed to implement and 
guarantee newly acquired rights. Legal advocacy must be part
of a larger strategy, not undertaken in isolation.
• Compromise is in the nature of rights acquired through legal 
battles. Failure to achieve the best law or court decision does not
mean all is lost. Success comes through a process of building and
testing precedents against new cases.
Mapping the Sliammon First Nation, Canada
“Through the application of GIS technology, the Sliammon
Treaty Society has completed traditional occupancy and use maps
[British Columbia, Canada]. One of the most important sources 
of information for these maps was oral history interviews completed 
with Sliammon elders from 1970 through 1999. The purpose of the
Sliammon Traditional Use Study was to create a comprehensive inventory
of traditional occupancy and use of Sliammon Lands and resources 
to support participation in a British Columbia Treaty Process and Crown
Lands Referral Process” (Aboriginal Mapping Network, 2001).
Oral history was an important source 
of information for the Sliammon Treaty
Society's maps.
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• Legal activists tend to have a big-picture view and may not 
adequately understand the political situation of winners and 
losers at the local level.29 Hence legal activism is most effective
when it is linked to grassroots reality and local leaders. 
STRATEGY 2: 
Mapping of Community Lands 
to Document Customary Rights 
Many NGOs have adopted the method of participatory mapping as
a way for communities to raise their own awareness about the status
and value of their resources. It can also build community consensus
on how to organize to defend tenure security or to make a claim for
ancestral or historically owned lands. 
Community mapping has been used successfully for years in a
wide range of countries and regions from Canada to Indonesia.30 In
this approach, local or international NGOs employ rapid appraisal
techniques to develop maps. Local people supply local place names,
land-use zones and the corresponding use and access information for
the area they are seeking to map. The resulting map is then used as
a first step to negotiate tenure rights deals with government agencies
and private firms (see Box on page 18). In some cases, the quality of the
map created far exceeds anything officially available, particularly in
remote or frontier areas. The popularity of this method is explained by
the simple fact that the mapping process elicits concrete information on
claims, along with a common, objective basis for discussing whether a
specific claim can finally be considered. Of course, a majority of
community members needs to agree to the map’s content. Mapping
should be contrasted to efforts to present a vague claim like “that place
belongs to us” without evidence of community consensus.31 Signatures
from all community households often strengthen the map’s legitimacy. 
Mapping can be used to demonstrate government corruption, as in
the Philippines where an NGO mapped the same areas previously
mapped by government teams. The new map demonstrated that gov-
ernment teams inserted their own names as landowners on the maps.32
Analysts of participatory mapping caution that it is essential to
conduct accurate mapping. It is also important to ensure full partic-
ipation throughout the community and neighboring communities.
Mapping can create local tensions over previously vague boundaries
between communities, crystallize existing inequalities, provoke new
local disputes, or ignore local visions of space that do not fit on typical
dimensions of traditional paper or computer maps.33
Supporting mapping often involves paying for training and the
organizational costs of the NGOs that provide the training in how to
make maps. NGOs also develop political acceptance for using maps to
develop tenure rights and support the legal process of claim-making
with the relevant authorities. Community-based organizations can do
this work as well if the skills exist to do so.
Lessons:
• Develop a strategy before mapping so that the map will serve 
its purpose. Different maps serve different purposes. 
• Use the map strategically and with caution. Maps are a powerful 
political tool, so good political instincts are necessary to use it well.
• Be careful about temporary permits based on claims that are not
well substantiated or established. These can lead to short-term
behavior by actors who have little confidence that they will gain
the rights in the long term.
• Early in the process, evaluate whether or not to involve govern-
ment. Mapping can become a political hot potato and governments
can chose to ban this activity if they perceive it as threatening. 
Strategies to Strengthen Community Tenure
20 Deeper Roots
• Early buy-in is a good idea in some cases.34 Some activists have
been more successful by building momentum for an independent
mapping movement before involving government.35
STRATEGY 3: 
Public Education and Lobbying to Develop a Shared
Understanding of Solutions to Tenure Problems
Public education and lobbying can be an effective means of establishing
a political constituency for community rights. As passage of the
South African Communal Property Associations (Annex 5) shows,
well-informed and active groups can influence policy makers and
legislatures during critical turning points in a country’s history, even
when civil society is weak. Niger and Tanzania are examples of countries
where this strategy has resulted in substantial overhauls of national
forest codes and land laws. 
For most developing countries, the critical turning points —when
lobbying and public awareness are most useful—occur during a transi-
tion to democracy, a change in government, a challenge to a govern-
ment’s legitimacy such as mass demonstrations in the streets, or a power
shift bringing reform-minded people to the top of important ministries.
Rapid public education at such a juncture often depends on building
connections, contacts and awareness across constituencies and among
journalist and media networks before the critical moment arrives.
During such critical moments, policy agendas are often reopened.
Then, people with a cause can typically find willing listeners.
Citizens, academics, think tanks, and nonprofit organizations are
able to interact with those in power. A common tactic at such
moments is launching a highly visible public conference on the key
issues of concern. These conferences sometimes attract media and
public attention. In turn, this attention can influence change in
tenure status. A key strategy in this regard is preparing data and
materials that clearly quantify and summarize the benefits of the
desired model of management and ownership—including returns to
the environment, returns to the economy, returns to equity and
social harmony, and returns to local livelihoods.
Donors have long supported this kind of public education and
lobbying, although in the developing world the nature of public edu-
cation may be different than in the United States. In the Philippines,
for example, donor-financed consulting reports on community prop-
erty rights influenced the national debate at the time.36 In Tanzania,
Britain’s foreign aid agency, the Department for International
Development (DFID), worked with an expatriate consultant to prepare
viable tenure legislation palatable to the Tanzanian Parliament.37 And
in the case of Niger described in the Box on page 21, both USAID and
the World Bank spent 18 years sticking with a project to create a
framework for property rights security within a new “code rurale,” a goal
that had once been thought impossible. 
Brazil is a famous case where this strategy was used in combination
with civic mobilization at the national and international levels. An
alliance with academics, local nonprofits and the international envi-
ronmental community allowed both the indigenous peoples of Brazil
and the rubber tappers to press their land claims into the interna-
tional arena.38 The combined effort of civic mobilization, high-level
public education and lobbying positively influenced the national
scene such that extractive reserves for indigenous peoples and for
rubber tappers were finally recognized and could be demarcated. 
In the case of South Africa’s Common Property Associations Act
(see Annex 5 for details), success meant having a national organiza-
tional and intellectual infrastructure already in place prior to the critical
moment when influence at high levels was possible. The Ford
Foundation had long supported think tanks, nonprofit organizations
and academic centers to do action research on tenure issues. Therefore,
a network of academics and organizations already was in place to
present legal options to a new government. That network urged the
new government to consider common property as one of many legal
options for the country. And to their credit, they succeeded.
Lessons:
• Lobbying is the end result of a long-term process of institutional
support and of building a field of organizations working on the
cause. When the moment is ripe, networks of people and organi-
zations must be ready to jump into action with concrete propos-
als. This implies prior expertise and experience with the tenure
issue and the prior existence of coalitions and networks that can
speak to power at an important juncture.
• When the moment comes, advocates must have the facts and figures
at the ready. This includes sufficient knowledge about the policy
positions and possible benefits to successfully advocate for change. 
• Legal changes may be only on paper and not implemented.
Other means may be necessary to assure political support 
for implementation and to solve related problems in the field.
STRATEGY 4: 
Supporting Working Groups to Transform 
Bureaucracies that Manage Common Property
Advocates can promote a policy change, but implementation
requires changes in the bureaucracy and in the minds of the people
who work within the bureaucracy. One theory of social change and
learning says that when people acquire new mental models or intellec-
tual ways of seeing or analyzing a problem, they become more receptive
The Case of Niger’s Rural Code 
As a Form of Tenure Change
Niger’s “Rural Code” and its related policy edicts allow 
for recognition of all types of land rights – be they collective or individual.
The code provides for all such claims to be mapped as registered. But 
if there is any local opposition to a specific claim, registration of that claim
is suspended until a special land court decision settles the dispute. 
The process of establishing this new rural code, informing the population
about it, creating the policy framework around it, and setting up the 
implementation mechanisms took 18 years (1986-1998). During this 
time there was much stop-and-go funding from a variety of donors,
notably USAID and the World Bank. Implementation of the code has been
very weak, due to the tepid support of traditional authorities, incomplete
decentralization, and the very high recurrent costs of running the 
11 regional land commissions which are supposed to arbitrate the many 
disputes that arise when attempting to map out and zone land claims. 
It was a heavily donor-driven process and was dependent on donor funding
for every step (Yacouba, 1999). 
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to experimentation and to changing habits, beliefs and policy posi-
tions.39 This is the idea behind a common strategy among donors to
support bureaucracy-based working groups, or affinity groups, on par-
ticular problems.40 Some also report that the mere act of bringing people
together to talk about a subject can lead to action because it focuses
participants on an important task or highlights a problem such that it
becomes a ministerial priority.41 Working groups are thus fora, where
preconceptions, data, new “mental models” and field experiments can
be discussed and assimilated.
In the Philippines, a government working group was established
with donor support to study innovations in farmer-managed irrigation
systems. It was led by a civil servant who was an advocate of such
systems. The working group took on the task of creating a setting for
ministerial “group learning” about specific field-based experimental
projects. These field projects represented a core innovation in the way
the irrigation bureaucracy did business. The working group constituted
a community of practice on the devolution concept and led to signifi-
cant changes in the way the Philippine irrigation bureaucracies related
to farming communities. Donors in this case paid for meeting costs,
study tours, consultants and research for the working group.42
Working groups in India for Joint Forest Management (Annex 2)
provide another example of support that included nonprofit organi-
zations and researchers from outside the forest service.
Lessons:
• Working groups are good vehicles for change when the obstacles 
to reform are not deeply embedded in a political economic context
that opposes any change at all. That is to say, it can work for a
problem like devolution of an irrigation authority to user groups,
but may not be useful for dealing with a problem like apartheid 
in South Africa prior to victory by the African National Congress. 
• Working groups are most useful when led by an advocate with
authority within a bureaucracy and where there is some the
desire to innovate. In such cases, it can widen the power of that
person within a bureaucracy and create some credibility and 
freedom to innovate without excessive resistance or sanctions. 
• Working groups need credible leaders. There is also a potential
danger to working groups: they can provide too much legitimacy 
to a government position opposed by advocacy groups. Supporters of
working groups must have a strategy prepared to address such cases. 
STRATEGY 5: 
Strengthening Politically Active Coalitions 
of Cause Leaders, Organizations and Networks
When promoting a cause like community property rights, all vested
organizations usually have a role to play. Researchers can provide the
data necessary for action. Think tanks and academics can produce
policy analyses. Grassroots nonprofits can help communities do
mapping and create land-use plans. Community leaders, federations
and associations, and sometimes local government authorities, can
build grassroots consensus and bring legitimacy to a critical political
moment. Activists can lobby government officials and legislators on
new ideas and models of how to do things. Training groups can facilitate
meetings and strategy sessions among all the players. Public interest
law firms can manage landmark cases. And leaders of these groups and
organizations can jointly plot ways to keep the issue in the public eye
through good marketing and claims on media attention. 
Negotiation, research, project management, accounting, budgeting,
teamwork, fundraising, public relations, social marketing, lobbying,
grassroots facilitation, coalition building, and use of GIS and participa-
Deeper Roots 23
tory appraisal are but a short list of the many skills that can come
into play in the reform movement for community property rights.
Rare are the individual organizations that combine all these skills.
Coalitions need to bring together an array of skills. To be effective,
they need to develop synergies and a coherent strategy.
A typical, time-honored strategy is to support the strengthening
of potential leaders, to organize the political constituency, and to
strengthen the constituency itself through networks. Particularly
important in the dialogue involving indigenous peoples worldwide is
the formation of horizontal linkages among indigenous leaders from
different regions and countries so that they are able to develop their
own direct dialogue with decision makers, rather than depend upon
NGOs and others for mediation.
Leadership can be supported in a variety of ways. Providing scholar-
ships and training opportunities for promising leaders has proven to
be highly effective. It is also important to support opportunities for
leaders in small organizations to practice skills as they confront real
challenges. Similarly, promoting exchange between leaders and
organizations within and between countries has proven to catalyze
learning and enthusiasm for change. It is important to build space for
all parties to enter a dialogue. 
For a grantmaker, this strategy also can include longer-term insti-
tutional assistance to key organizations such as support for vehicles,
computers and Internet access. It can also include long-term core
support for a group’s operating costs. A good example of the success
of this strategy is in Brazil, where the Ford Foundation played a key
role over many years in supporting and strengthening the Instituto
Socioambiental (ISA), a Brazilian organization famous for its
authoritative work on the rights and fate of that country’s indigenous
people.43
This strategy can also mean the establishment and training of
local networks of cause-related organizations. The most important
lesson from such an approach is the need for long-term flexible funding
to an array of local, national and international organizations working on
the issue at once. There is a need to facilitate collaboration and
learning among them so that a community of practice and an effective
political constituency emerge.
STRATEGY 6: 
Piloting Working Models That Illustrate 
Successful Commons Management
Some important obstacles to changing tenure security include the use
of erroneous received wisdom on the faults of common property, insti-
tutional complacency, and the practical challenge of getting a viable
model off the ground. Pilot projects help demonstrate that it is possible
to implement change. They also give government agencies opportunity
to experiment with getting a model right. Once in place, a model can
set in motion a powerful chain of events that creates national change
(see Box on page 25). This is especially the case when people believe
that their place, site, region, or country is so unusual that models suc-
cessful elsewhere cannot possibly work in their place or country. 
Exchange visits and apprenticeships for people to learn about
donor-supported models can be very powerful. When individual
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communities or ethnic groups realize that they have more options
than they thought, they are often motivated to support change. It
may be necessary to link people from very different cultural and
political settings so that they can see solutions outside their own
political and historical context. This approach also helps to highlight
experiences from more economically diverse countries such as Europe
and North America, illustrating that options may have little to do
with a given country’s stage of “development.” 
Change can also come from innovative government officials who
are at the margin of the policies and regulations set by their own
institutions. A classic case is India’s Joint Forest Management. JFM
began in a situation where government ownership of forests was widely
accepted. It started as a local level “innovation” when a forestry official
in West Bengal struck a deal with a local community to keep farmers
out of his timber research forest in exchange for a share of the future
timber harvest. The innovation and variations on that first JFM
agreement spread in West Bengal and then to other states. As JFM
spread, other “foresters at the margin” experimented on their own
to create models relevant to their local settings. With help of a
donor-supported working group, the idea of joint management
agreements for forest use spread throughout India. 
Another example of building a working model to create change is
described in detail in Annex 3. It is the case of a community in Lombok,
Indonesia. There, a local NGO pioneered the use of a community
forestry concession, first on the tiny scale of 25 hectares. Once the
model was accepted, the concession was expanded to 500 hectares, and
it may be expanded farther in the future. Other NGOs across Indonesia
tried similar strategies on the local level. With the recent change of
government in Indonesia, the idea of a community forest concession is
no longer regarded as ludicrous as once it had been. In fact, the govern-
ment has issued a decree (Decree 31 of April 2001) to encourage
local government agencies to allow such community concessions.
Many communities of course would prefer full ownership rights over
their forests.
Lessons
• Building a model as a “pilot” for change requires cultivating 
local leadership and often many years of testing before it can be
scaled up and called a success. It is also important to recognize that
reaching a critical scale requires collaboration with governments
and other donors.
• To be successful, pilots require research, public education and
strengthening cause-related organizations. 
• A pilot project has to do more than demonstrate physical benefits
in order to persuade opponents that it is acceptable. For example, 
it may be necessary to show the public that government expenditure
will be reduced because the community model will require less
policing action. 
• An economy of scale is important. West Bengal, Andra Pradesh and
Sujhomajari in India all profited from NGOs working in regional
contexts with a core set of communities to advance the model. 
• Joint exchange visits to pilot projects by government officials
and community leaders can stimulate productive discussion and
build trust.
• University researchers can play a key mediating role and enable
governments to accept the changes offered in a pilot model.
A Model That Worked: A Community
Concession in Petén, Guatemala
Environmentalists helped established a national park
in Petén, Guatemala called the Maya Biosphere Reserve. Local residents,
however, continued to cut timber out of the reserve. A solution was found.
With help of the environmental organizations, a buffer zone around the
park was established, and initially local residents were organized into five
community organizations. These organizations were granted timber 
concessions within the buffer zone. As of 2001, those involved claimed
that the community was no longer invading the park to seek timber and is,
in fact, earning about $500 a year per family in the buffer zone conces-
sions. The model is being extended within Guatemala and is often cited as
one that other countries might follow (Jukofsy, 2000).
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STRATEGY 7: 
Building Civic Mobilization 
around Better Commons Management 
Civic mobilization is often essential to achieve major reforms. As the
Bolivia case illustrates (Annex 6), civic activity can be mobilized by
lobbying ministers, holding conferences, and staging peaceful
protests and marches to attract media attention.44 But it relies on
sound organizations for sustained support in order to be effective. For
example, in Bolivia, an indigenous peoples’ organization built broad
support for indigenous demands through an arduous and difficult march
from the lowlands to the high altitudes of the capital to ask the presi-
dent to grant them property rights. They sought other legal reforms
through a single law that would recognize the integrated rights of
indigenous peoples—such as tenure, education, health and human
rights. There was no violence, and the tactic worked to gain sympathy
from media and wider society. Although the government eventually
passed a law to enable indigenous communities to claim land rights,
many lowland indigenous communities are still struggling for final-
ization and enforcement of their property rights. Brazil also saw civic
mobilization around the cause of the rubber tappers led by Chico
Mendez and promoted by international organizations, which led to the
creation of extractive reserves.45 In Indonesia, civic mobilization forced
a dictator to resign. Now, progress is being made by the Coalition for
the Democratization of Natural Resources in its efforts to achieve some
of the demands made at the time of the mobilization campaign.46
Civic mobilization also is very important to the property rights
causes of Native Americans in both Canada and the U.S. 
A famous case is that of Clayoquot Sound. There, paper and logging
companies, such as MacMillan Bloedel and Interfor, had official
rights to log old growth temperate rain forests claimed by the 
Buffer zones can be useful 
in easing conflicts between
protected areas and local people.
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Nuu-Chah-Nulth First Nation. Environmentalists disputed the cor-
porate and government plan for the forest. This was followed by nearly
15 years of civic mobilization, blockades, tree-sitting, negotiation and
the largest civic disobedience acts in Canadian history. Finally, it
resulted in an alliance of First Nation and environmentalists, as well
as the Canadian government’s recognition of First Nation rights over
their traditional territory.47
Lessons:
• Civic mobilization requires community solidarity and commitment
at the grassroots level, a network of effective organizations, a
pool of activists willing to take substantial risks often in the face
of unlikely odds, and the strategic ability to seize judicious 
political moments to advance a cause.
• The role of external supporters is separate and different from
those of local NGOs or advocacy groups.
• Donors are most effective when they support diverse actors,
encourage them to build coalitions and strategize together, and
give them the freedom to respond to opportunities as they arise. 
Key Emerging Issues
By Andy White
The bulk of NGO and government efforts to secure tenure, as well
as the bulk of the previous discussion on strategies, focuses on land.
But forests provide many different products and services. Along with
rights to land and rights to the forest, rights to each of the many
products and services can all be different. When this natural complexi-
ty is complemented by indigenous knowledge and intellectual property,
few countries have legal frameworks to deal adequately with these issues,
and an almost endless set of emerging issues can be imagined. 
Among the most obvious and pressing issues are those surrounding
the emerging markets for genetic material, preserved landscapes, water
filtration, soil and biodiversity protection, carbon sequestration and car-
bon sinks. Communities have legitimate claims to these products and
services, and the potential income from them can contribute 
significantly to incomes and livelihoods. However, these claims will be
ignored and overruled unless there is concerted and quick action by
NGOs and donors to advance community interests with governments
and the private sector. If government does not act, it may even be
necessary for private investors entering these markets to pay for
independent adjudication of competing claims before marketing any
Forests provide many 
valuable products and services
to support rural livelihoods.
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• There are many transitional democracies in a state of turbulence,
creating more opportunities. But communities and their advocates
must be prepared to move forward. 
• With the increasing trends of decentralization and devolution,
local governments around the world are playing larger roles in
land administration. Depending upon their capacity and legal
authority, this shift could lead to better or worse outcomes.
• Real estate markets are emerging in remote areas, and there 
is increased land speculation as populations grow. Community
lands easily disappear as land is sold to investors to build hotels
or resort cabins for their own use.
The Box on page 28 presents a set of “counter-strategies” that may
reverse the progress made by communities to protect their rights 
to ancestral territories. Communities, activists and donors must be
cognizant of these schemes in order to respond to them effectively. 
Conclusions and
Recommendations
By Andy White
This report has shown that various strategies can be effective to help
communities gain more secure property rights over forest resources.
While progress and impact have occurred, work must continue because
of the scale of the problem of limited community tenure rights and
security. More organizations with different expertise must be involved,
engaging in the strategies described above and addressing the emerging
issues. We believe that recognition of community tenure is urgent,
where it is appropriate, because: 1) deforestation and degradation
specific service. There is an urgent need to develop and put into
practice social and environmental standards for investments in these
communities.
At the community end, knowledge about the rights and responsi-
bilities of owned materials and services must be expanded. Additional
work is needed to educate and inform communities of their right, and
to develop legal models for beginning the long process of reforming
laws and facilitating networks of community representatives and
advocates active in legal reforms. 
Peasant and indigenous mobilizations, coupled with an increasing
interaction between international companies and rural communities,
point toward a set of trends:
• There is a growing number of international treaties that touch
on indigenous rights.
• There is a growing presence of local community stakeholders
with their own global representatives.
• NGOs and donors are not automatically accountable to commu-
nities. While communities are increasingly voicing their concerns
about this, there are no clear solutions.
• War and conflict are spreading in areas where community-based
tenure is an option.
• International companies dealing in extractive industries such as
oil and mining are moving rapidly to stake their claims in forests
all over the world where unclear tenure is still an issue. 
• National governments are ineffective in controlling and monitoring
environmental and social impacts. Their legal frameworks lack
answers to key questions, such as: How should companies relate 
to local communities and indigenous peoples? What are the legal
processes for this? What are the means for resolving disputes? 
How can communities monitor compliance on their lands?
Conclusions and Recommendations
1. Neutralize government agencies that are
supposed to enforce laws.
2. Relate directly to community leaders and
give them cash to corrupt them. Damage
their relationship with their constituency.
3. Bypass leaders and political bodies and
selectively work with individuals in the 
community.
4. Provide limited information about the project
and the legal obligations of the company to
the community. During initial phases of
environmental impact assessment (EIA),
consult without fully informing people of
their rights under the law. In answer to ques-
tions, give highly technical information that
community members cannot understand.
5. Manipulate expectations of the community
while hiding information. In the first stage,
to get signatures of authorities, behave well
and respond to requests as though they will
be honored. Then after entering the commu-
nity lands, give excuses for unkept promises
or say it will be done “next year.” 
6. Maintain paternalistic relationship with
community by giving supplies (school 
notebooks, aspirin) and services (visiting
dentist) to keep people quiet about the
environmental damage.
7. When communities unite, then divide and
conquer. Give favored treatment to some
of the communities and not to others. 
8. Undermine leaders’ credibility and political
base. Selectively work with one leader or
NGO without following appropriate channels
in community government/organizations,
and then put community authorities 
in a position where they have to take
responsibility for decisions without knowing
about the negotiations and information 
from meetings between companies and
political leaders or NGOs. 
9. Say “nothing is wrong” when confronted 
with environmental impact evidence, such
as fish kills. Say scientifically gathered 
evidence shows water is clean when impact
is invisible to the eye. Refuse to discuss
long-term impacts.
The solutions for these problems lie in 
better relationships between government and
community and in strengthening community
organization (“internal organization”) to 
confront these problems. For example, Pancur
Kasih in Indonesia trains communities in 
confronting logging companies and informs
them about the consequences of confrontation,
how to watch out for the ways companies will
try to divide them, how to maintain solidarity
against the companies, and the legal strategies
they can use to assert their customary land
rights and laws (force companies to pay 
customary fines, etc). These are political
strategies that “create law” through practice.
Written by Janis Alcorn and adapted from Oyendu Magazine, 
December 2000, “Las estrategías de las empresas petroleras frente 
a las organizaciones indígenas.”
Some Counter Strategies Used by Extractive Companies to Deal with Indigenous Organizations
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continue to destroy the natural assets of indigenous and other commu-
nities; 2) the growing market for forest ecosystem services is likely to
bypass or even hurt local communities unless proactive efforts are made
to protect them; 3) governments and societies do not have the financial
resources to carry out many of the protection and management tasks
currently assigned to them, but which are more cost effective at the local
level; and 4) proposals to undermine community participation or bypass
it by establishing extensive commercial forest plantations do not
address local livelihoods, sustainability or poverty alleviation. Secure
community tenure can help avert these trends. Increasing government
openness, along with social and political support for communities,
provides an historic opportunity for action.
Building the Community
Seizing this opportunity will require the development of a new, much
larger and more effective international political constituency and
community of practice. As illustrated in Figure 2, critical institu-
tional actors—community federations and associations, public law
groups, activists and NGOs, researchers, policy groups, community
development and training organizations, multilateral institutions
and governmental agencies—each have a critical role in putting into
place the building blocks of community tenure security. 
This new community should develop and act with forest communi-
ties on a new agenda. This agenda could be used to: 1) accelerate the
transition from access to public forests to community ownership,
where communities have claims; 2) highlight where private ownership
may not be most appropriate, providing local communities with
greater access to these public forests; 3) aggressively explore and
develop mechanisms to ensure the protection of community rights
in markets for environmental services and genetic materials; and 
4) develop and support effective enforcement mechanisms for 
protecting community property.
To achieve these goals, this new, broader community of practice
should: 1) collect data on property claims and ownership at local,
regional and global scales. These data are necessary to formulate and
promote arguments for advancing community claims; 2) educate
government officials and donors on the issues of community rights
and the very feasible possibilities for enhancing their livelihoods with
tenure reform; 3) link the emerging networks of community tenure
advocates to build a concerted international political constituency
able to leverage new funds, new technology, and new political openness
to expand community rights; and 4) develop new partnerships with
governments and selected multi- and bilateral agencies. Achieving
substantial change at national levels means that more effort needs to
be put into collaborative efforts. 
Moreover, at the governmental and donor level there is a lack of
awareness about the nature and scale of the property rights problem
when it comes to forests. Hence, some funding should be targeted to
educating donors and government officials. Each of these approaches
helps build the community. Major donors, particularly the Ford
Foundation, are uniquely positioned to power this agenda. A summary
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Conclusions and Recommendations
Proposals to undermine community participation 
or bypass it by establishing extensive commercial
forest plantations do not address local livelihoods,
sustainability or poverty alleviation. 
of action steps is included in the Box on page 31. 
Building for the Future
As we have stated earlier, tenure security is a critical step, but certainly
not the only step necessary to advance sustainable livelihoods and
forest management. Where communities have gained more secure rights,
such as in parts of British Columbia and in the Amazon, communities
and their supporters are beginning to work on “second-generation”
issues—those associated with the challenge of converting these newly
secured forest resources into assets for social and economic develop-
ment. While their tenure may be more secure than before, most forest
policies favor large companies and landholders over small ones, and
communities continue to face an uneven playing field in trying to
compete in forest markets. Many communities have forged ahead
despite the policy and business barriers, embarking on a search for
sustainable business models. They will need long-term funding and the
time to experiment. The political and economic opportunity has never
been as open as it is today to respond effectively to this global challenge
and to ensure that enhanced tenure security leads to better outcomes
for the communities and for the forests.
Case Studies 
Prepared by Lynn Ellsworth
CASE 1: Demarcation of Indigenous Lands in Brazil
Forest Tenure in Brazil. There are about 360,000 indigenous
peoples in Brazil representing 0.2 percent of the national population.
Public Law Groups
Legal Cases
Training Locals
Dispute Resolution
Researchers
Mapping
Information 
Dissemination
Community Development
& Training Organizations
Organizational Skills
Conflict Resolution
Business Management
Government Agencies
Legal Framework
Implementing
Settle Disputes
Policy Groups
Inform Decision Making
Public Education
Lobbying
Activists and NGOs
Mobilizing
Demarcating
Planning
Figure 2:
Towards Tenure Security: 
Actors and Actions
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• Support anti-corruption and
justice reform activities at national
levels. Strengthen local and national legal
groups by financing training, salaries, and the
costs of specific legal casework. Resources 
to support training and case mentorship 
for would–be public interest lawyers and
judges may be essential.
• Support development of the legal
process of claim-making through various
actions. Support mapping by financing 
training and organizational costs of the 
nonprofits who utilize it to support 
community-based tenure reform. 
• Support direct advocacy and the
longer-term process of nurturing organizations
so that networks are prepared to jump into
action with concrete proposals.
• Convene people to discuss specific
tenure issues. This focuses people on an
important task or highlights a problem so 
that it becomes a ministerial priority. Working
groups are fora where preconceptions, data,
new “mental models” and field experiments
can be discussed and assimilated.
• Support emerging leaders.
Strengthen leaders and organizations 
who represent community or indigenous 
constituents. Providing scholarships and
training opportunities should be complemented
with opportunities for community leaders 
to interact with parliamentarians and other
political leaders.
• Build successful field models. 
This requires cultivating local leadership and
often many years of testing before it can 
be scaled up. Avoid promoting pilots that 
represent the lowest common denominator
acceptable to government as this can 
undermine efforts at more meaningful reform.
• Mobilize civic society. This requires 
a network of effective organizations, broad
grassroots commitment based on a common 
understanding of the problem, a pool of
activists willing to take substantial risks 
in the face of unlikely odds and the ability 
to seize judicious political moments to
advance the cause.
• Create a global learning network
that includes cross-site visits and apprentice-
ships nationally and cross-regionally. This will
raise public awareness, sharpen advocacy
strategies, and speed change in countries that
have been slow to change.
• Support federations and
credit/marketing associations in
communities that are attempting to exercise
their tenurial rights, in addition to supporting
NGOs to build informed grassroots capacity 
and commitment to the political responsibili-
ties required to maintain tenure rights.
Opportunities to Advance Community Tenure Security: A Summary
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Their fate in the modern world has been uncertain and their plight has
been an international cause. The government of Brazil has adopted a
protectionist philosophy toward its indigenous peoples, creating a sepa-
rate ministry—Fundaçao Nacional do Indio (FUNAI)—to provide specif-
ically for their legal, social and health needs. In 1988, a transition to
democratic rule brought about political and social changes from which
a more vocal and organized civil society emerged. The Constitution of
1988 recognizes that indigenous peoples have the right to live in their
traditional manner on their ancestral lands and that the federal govern-
ment has the responsibility of awarding these lands claimed ancestrally.
This constitution was a remarkable step forward for the rights of indige-
nous peoples. Many claims for land rights were presented. More than
half of the claims were fully demarcated and registered by 2001. The
claimed territories account for about 12 percent of the country’s
landmass and are almost entirely concentrated in the Amazon.
The Process of Tenure Reform for Indigenous Forest
Rights. Indigenous peoples now have a modest degree of tenure secu-
rity within the areas demarcated after 1988. The process is in principle
simple: the government grants the land to one or various groups and
gives compensation to private landowners for giving up that land.
Indigenous reserves give indigenous peoples a place to live and a place
to practice their traditional livelihoods, but they are not empowered to
use their resources in a commercial manner. The underlying intent of
government is not to provide indigenous people with a tradable asset
base for dealing with the modern world, but rather to give them a  refuge
where they can be free of pressure to change their traditional lifestyle. 
The Ford Foundation played an important role in the demarcation
of indigenous lands. For a decade, Ford funded and supported the
NGOs and researchers at the center of the debate over how to protect
the indigenous population. These agents of change (e.g., Instituto
Socioambiental) modified public perceptions about indigenous living
conditions and rights, lobbied legislators to include indigenous rights
in the debate for a new constitution, and informed the international
community about the urgent need to protect indigenous peoples’
habitat. Ford also funded mapping activities, sponsored influential
research and symposia by leading academics, such as anthropologist
Joâo Pacheco at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro. These activi-
ties helped make the government and the international community
aware of the importance of social justice for indigenous communities. 
Territories held by indigenous groups are subject to the oversight and
managerial authority of FUNAI. When a territory is to be demarcated,
FUNAI sends an anthropologist who writes an account of territorial
use. This information is translated into maps and published in the
Federal Journal for public review. Since 1996, a new legal provision
allows private landowners in the claimed territory to request compensa-
tion for any infrastructure they have built in the area, a procedure that
has slowed the process. Documentation for claimed areas is sent to the
Ministry of Justice, which must approve the demarcation. If accepted,
the land is then physically demarcated with highly visible signs—a
tough job since some of the territories are the size of Belgium and some
have international borders. When demarcation is complete, the presi-
dent of Brazil issues a decree recognizing the indigenous territory. 
Nonprofit groups are active in assisting indigenous groups to
make claims and in advocating on their behalf, but resistance from
landholders living in the claimed areas is strong. These landholders
have pressured the government to either dismiss claims or slow
demarcation processes. Other problems have been noted in the
establishment of indigenous territories. Boundaries are often simply
not recognized, being de facto indefensible. Land invasion by outsiders—
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from farmers to goldminers—is typical; illegal logging is rampant;
and violence against indigenous people remains common. Some
community leaders do not always act on behalf of community interest,
and unfair business deals are frequent. 
Enhanced tenure security for Brazil’s indigenous people has not
solved all problems. While some indigenous groups are marketing
products from their forests, others retain a more subsistence-level
lifestyle. Compensation to indigenous groups for outside use of their
resources and knowledge of indigenous plants and organisms remains an
international issue. Suicide rates among indigenous groups are still
higher than the Brazilian average, and they continue to be vulnerable
to outside diseases and pollution from mining, logging and oil drilling.
The lands around the indigenous territories remain unregulated, a
situation that poses numerous threats to the indigenous people.
Looking Forward, Future Challenges. Activists see that
seeking tenure security by mapping and decree is only the beginning
of a process. Obviously, it is an essential and widely applauded first
step toward justice, but much work remains to assure implementa-
tion and to find economic models that honor the natural resources
and the traditions of the indigenous peoples. 
Abstracted from the following sources: Martin, 2001; Barbosa, 2000; Cowell, 1999; Cardoso, 1999
CASE 2: India’s Joint Forest Management Network
By Lynn Ellsworth and Chetan Agarwal
Forest Tenure in India. Joint Forestry Management in India is a
process in which communities sign agreements with forestry officials to
manage and rehabilitate degraded forests. In exchange, communities
gain widely varying, but usually limited use and access rights to timber
and nontimber forest products, depending on the specifics of the
agreement. Communities are also expected to regulate access to the
forest by both members and nonmembers.
JFM in its current form was started by an official working group in
West Bengal that developed an agreement with a local community to
manage a forest in the 1970s. Over time, it was hailed as a great step
forward in participatory development, and the model was expanded
nationally. Since then, it has been the subject of a tremendous
amount of academic research and activist advocacy. Activitists now
focus on ways to establish tenure rights over forests that are stronger
than mere use rights.
Course of Events and Implications. The JFM model owes
much of its popularity to the fact that it can solve the problem of how
to regenerate a forest at low cost. Some say it also played a key role in
stabilizing forest cover in India. The Ford Foundation provided
important support for the NGOs that created the national-level JFM
network, which aimed at gaining bureaucratic support in the the
government for JFM. (The working groups idea was started by Ford
Case Studies
Nonprofit groups are active in assisting indigenous
groups to make claims and in advocating 
on their behalf, but resistance from landholders 
living in the claimed areas is strong. 
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Foundation program officers in the Philippines and elsewhere in Asia,
see Poffenberger, 1988.) 
In the early years (1989-91) of Ford support for JFM ideas, there
were meetings of Ford Foundation grantees on specific forestry issues.
At that time there were over 50 programmatic grants on forestry and
rural development. A large number were concentrated in the states
of West Bengal and Haryana, the states with experiments in partici-
patory forest management dating to the 1970s. The Ford Foundation
played an important role in organizing a statewide meeting in West
Bengal; the meeting was instrumental in passage of a state govern-
ment resolution to recognize and promote participatory forestry. The
Ford Foundation went on to facilitate state-level working groups in
Haryana and West Bengal.
A 1990 workshop in Delhi brought together government officials
interested in promoting JFM and numerous researchers from Haryana,
West Bengal and Gujarat to create a nascent JFM network. The central
government had also passed a notification in June 1990 suggesting
that states should start their own JFM programs. This opened an
opportunity to promote JFM nationwide. 
If 1989-91 were the years of advocacy at state and national levels,
1991-93 may be termed the years of promoting JFM. A National
Support Group (NSG) was established at the 1992 meeting of the JFM
network at Suraj Kund, near Delhi. It brought together hundreds of par-
ticipants to kick start the network with a focus on starting a dialogue
between foresters and NGOs, promoting examples of JFM and under-
taking participatory research that highlighted the benefits of JFM for
forests and for people. By 1993, the network had been decentralized
thematically, to focus JFM research on ecological/economic and insti-
tutional research and training. 1993-96 were consolidation years—the
research networks undertook participatory research and developed a
profile for their work. In 1994, a subgroup was formed to focus on
gender and equity issues  within the institutional research network. By
1996 the focus had moved to examining “second generation issues;” for
example, the impacts of JFM on women and the landless and the role
of NTFPs (nontimber forest products) in providing early benefits, as
well as the importance of the microplan for documenting forest
dependency and for including the interests of diverse forest users with
differential bargaining powers. 
Since 1997, as regional and state-level advocacy have increased,
the Ford Foundation, the NSG and key network members have
focused increasingly on promoting regional networking efforts that
focus on individual states and regions. The frequency of national
meetings has been reduced, and they have been moved from Delhi as
The JFM network in India has helped
to regenerate forests cheaply.
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well. In the last four years, the last two meetings were held in state
capitals. Further, in recent years, there has been greater and more
broad-based participation by senior forest department staff. Clearly,
the sheer scale of JFM—more than 10 million hectares and 35,000
village groups in about 20 states—means that it has become a significant
reality in India rather than just an idea.
Positive impacts of the network include:
• dialogue among the previously antagonistic forest 
department, NGOs and researchers;
• recognition for those forest officials who participate in the net-
work;
• experience-sharing between stakeholders and across regions;
• jointly determined research agendas and new participatory
research across regions, e.g., the Ecological and Economic
Research group conducting coordinated research in 12 zones
covering about 60 sites;
• enhanced recognition of gender and equity questions in state
JFM orders; and
• a brand name. Network membership in a national-level network,
based in Delhi has provided some brand recognition for members
and facilitated their dealings with state-level bureaucracies, 
especially at field levels.
At the time of inception, JFM was seen as an innovation for many
communities which had limited control and de jure access to often
degraded forests. But as time went on, historians and field workers
began to report that in some places, JFM could be a step backward in
property rights. Critics believe that JFM has distracted attention
from the injustice of the underlying property regime, in which gov-
ernment progressively claimed ownership of much of India’s forest,
which originally was managed under viable common property
regimes. Some also point out that JFM is a better deal for the govern-
ment foresters than it is for communities. This is because it mostly
solves a forestry department management problem: how to cheaply
regenerate degraded forests. Others argue, with good evidence, that
JFM creates new obligations for communities without resolving older
claims, resulting in declining property rights for some communities.
Those in question are communities that had strong existing rights
such as the Van Panchayats in Uttaranchal or the members of Forest
Cooperative Societies in Himachal Pradesh. For both of those com-
munities, JFM was a step backward from progressive institutional
arrangements established under the Indian Forest Act of 1927. 
Looking Forward, Future Challenges. JFM is best seen as
an incremental improvement in use rights when full property rights
are not on the political agenda. However, observers suggest that given
time, the nature of the conversation on JFM is likely to turn to ways
in which government can help communities manage their own
forests, rather than focusing on ways in which communities can help
government manage government forests. There are new ideas enter-
ing the dialogue, including Community Forest Management and
Participatory Forest Management, as well as some indications of
greater support for communities’ rights and decision-making. Some
even speak of increasing the return local people get from forests.
Thus far, more substantial rights have been given only to forests with
less than 30 percent canopy or to degraded forests. An active debate is
under way in India, and it is opening up these questions of land rights. 
Abstracted from Agarwal, 2001, and Khare, 2000.
Case Studies
36 Deeper Roots
CASE 3: Forest Concession and Landlessness 
in Nusa Tenggara, Indonesia 
In Indonesia, large-scale forestry began on the islands out-
side Java in the mid-1960s with the passage of legislation introducing
forest concessions. The situation for each island is different, but forest
dwellers have increasingly pressed for recognition of their traditional
rights to forests within their areas of use. Outcomes have been mixed.
One case that can be thought of as a success is on the island of Lombok
in Sesaot village, which is located near Mount Rinjani in Nusa
Tenggara, Indonesia. The village is adjacent to a forest of about 6,000
hectares. The forest is part of a watershed supplying the southern part
of the island. Much of the forest is degraded because the government’s
Forestry Department managed the area as a “production forest.” 
Course of Events and Implications. The government
declared the forest logged out by 1953, although the forestry department
had a tradition of replanting mahogany in the forest as a revenue-
earning measure for government. But throughout the 1970s degradation
of the forest worsened. In 1983 the watershed was so obviously under
threat that the government reclassified the forest as a “protected area.”
Local logging was then severely restricted, but the government
retained the right to cut the planted mahogany for its own use. The
local forestry department even maintained a revenue target of about
US$200,000 per year from ongoing mahogany harvests. Local people
did not share in that revenue.
In response to village grievances over the new, tight local logging
restrictions, the governor of the province declared a buffer zone of 100
meters around the boundary of the newly formed protected area.
“Within it every village family was granted a quarter of a hectare of
forest land to set up agroforestry activities.” Villagers were instructed
on planting mahogany for their own use and sale. Coffee was allowed,
but the government imposed a 50 percent tax on it. The tax was
viewed as a rental payment for using the buffer zone. It also served as
a way for government to discourage coffee production, which was
considered inappropriate to the forestry department’s agroforestry
model of farming.
Villages did not like either the managerial rules in the buffer zone or
the agroforestry model promoted by government. They wanted to plant
coffee and other trees that did not interest the forestry department.
Farmers also insisted the coffee tax was unfair, and they argued that the
canopy created by the mahogany stunted the growth of coffee.
Moreover, it is not clear that the forestry department’s agroforestry
model of coffee and mahogany was economically superior to the
farmer’s model (Borsa, 2001). Farmers finally persuaded the forestry
department to grant them a tiny 25-hectare concession of the protected
area where they could try their own ideas for sustainable forest man-
agement. In exchange, they offered to take on the burden of protecting
the forest themselves, rather than having the forest department do it.
An NGO, LP3ES, facilitated this agreement. LP3ES helped the farmers
create a coalition of nine farmer groups to conduct negotiations and to
organize against illegal logging. 
An agreement with the government was reached in late 1995.
The farmers agreed on the following: to reforest the 25-hectare conces-
sion area and contribute 80 percent of the seedlings necessary; to
maintain the existing indigenous trees; to enforce and police the
forestry department rules about logging; and to accept that the govern-
ment would retain ownership of the forest. In exchange, the farmers
received rights to harvest timber in the concession area and to use
the land for agroforestry-style farming. The farmer coalition then
Deeper Roots 37
decided on the following prioritized list of those with access to the
new concession:
1. farmers without agricultural land in the previously established 
buffer zone or village area;
2. “female farmers without husbands, but with children and no job;”
3. members of the coalition of nine-farmer groups;
4. people aware of the rules established with the forestry
department; and
5. people willing to do the agreed-upon replanting without
technical assistance from the outside.
Fifty-eight families were eventually selected. They worked in groups
of four families to do the replanting work in their allotted areas. Most
replanted economically viable trees like durian, candlenut, jackfruit
and albizia. The farmer coalition also organized poaching patrols. It
reported illegal loggers to the forestry department, but had no legal
authority to try cases. This limited the patrols’ effectiveness. A few
years later, an evaluation reported the survival rate of the newly planted
trees as a remarkable 93 percent, with most families earning the
equivalent of about $500 per year from their planted trees. 
After some time, the forestry department allowed the farmer
coalition to fine illegal loggers from within the coalition’s own ranks,
although outsiders were still tried by the forestry department. The
coalition found that it was unable to impose strong sanctions, even
when violators were turned over to the police after the coalition
determined them “guilty-as-charged,” as accused loggers would still
get off lightly. The problem remains unresolved.
The model, however, was considered an overall success in terms of
protecting livelihoods and watersheds, so the farmer coalition won the
right in 1999 to expand the concession area to an additional 211
hectares of degraded forest. That land was then allocated to 1,240
additional farming families selected from an applicant pool of 1,497
families. A local team was established to select families for the new
concession area using the variables described above. Once again, man-
agement of the additional hectares was regarded as a success. The farmer
coalition then incorporated as an association and proposed taking on
management of an additional 1,000 hectares of the protected area. 
Looking Forward, Future Challenges. As of this writing,
the proposal for an additional 1,000 hectares had been rejected by a
district officer who did not favor that level of decentralization. But
given the many legal changes and policy movement towards decen-
tralization in Indonesia, it is entirely possible that the group will
eventually get its chance to manage the 1,000 hectares. This case
shows the importance of building a viable model in the field to prove
a project’s viability. It also shows the incremental, locally negotiated
character of tenure and property rights over forest resources. 
Sources: Most of this case was abstracted from Suryadi, 2001. Material was also obtained from Ellsworth, 2001,
Campbell, 2001; Bennet, 2001, and Borsa, 1997.
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CASE 4: The Philippines Indigenous 
Peoples’ Rights Act of 1997
By Danièle Perrot-Maître and Lynn Ellsworth
Forest Tenure in the Philippines. Indigenous communities
in the Philippines represent about 16 percent of the country’s popu-
lation. Until recently, these people have had little security of tenure
over their ancestral lands. Government agencies allocated resource
use rights to forest concessionaires and mining interests, often ignoring
community claims to land and forests. 
The Process of Tenure Reform for Indigenous Forest
Rights. While researching the property rights situation of
Philippines’ indigenous peoples, an American public interest law
attorney teaching at the University of Philippines law school uncovered
a case dating from the beginning of the 20th century. That showed
that the King of Spain had recognized indigenous property rights.
The attorney’s legal finding of this fact resulted in the overturn of a
legal doctrine stating that all land belonged to the crown (or the
government), from the moment Spain’s representatives set foot on
the Archipelago. This legal detective work provided the perfect
ammunition that many social justice-minded law students in the
Philippines needed to help indigenous peoples in their quest to obtain
greater property rights. As these law students graduated, they became
public interest attorneys and NGO activists themselves. For ten years,
they worked with a coalition of indigenous peoples for congressional
passage of the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act. In 1997, they finally
secured passage of the act. Their victory was due to a confluence of
factors: a favorable political context with the emergence of democracy;
the quality of their legal work; success at building a coalition of NGOs
and indigenous peoples’ organizations to do the necessary lobbying;
the personality of the senator who sponsored the bill; willingness to
compromise and “water down” the original bill; and good timing. At
first, the victory appeared to be short-lived, for mining interests
quickly challenged the bill. Finally, in a remarkable 2001 court session,
the Supreme Court of the Philippines upheld the constitutionality
of the act.
The act did not appear out of nowhere. It was built on a significant
local history that influenced ideas about the ways in which things
could be done. For example, in 1974, an indigenous group established a
precedent by getting a communal lease to public forests. Then in
Many governments are beginning 
to recognize the ownership claims
of indigenous communities 
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1982, after martial law was lifted, an experiment began with a new
tenure instrument called a “Certificate of Stewardship Contract.”
The certificate paved the way for the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) to test “Communal Forest
Stewardship Agreements” in 1986, as a kind of lease. The DENR
expanded use of these leases in the subsequent year. And in 1990,
DENR circulars created a task force to work on the problem of iden-
tifying Ancestral Land Domains. In a next step, the DENR created
actual rules for accepting and evaluating ancestral land claims. In
1993, a new DENR order recognized Ancestral Domains and provided
the basis for the concept of land delineation outlined in the
Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act. As a result, indigenous communities
mapped more than one million hectares of their lands. Ancestral
Domains claims were submitted to the government, thus pushing for
a legal definition of Ancestral Domain. Hence, change built upon
change in an incremental fashion.
Looking Forward, Future Challenges. The act is considered
by many to be a step forward for more secure community property
rights. It provides indigenous communities with a legal basis to make
their claims and even requires that communities be informed and
consulted before any mining concessions or other projects are started.
Yet the act has important limits. Property rights are still weak, as the
act merely grants indigenous people priority use rights over Ancestral
Domains (except in the case of individual farms which can be sold).
It also gives local people the responsibility for managing resources, a
potentially costly burden. Indigenous communities remain subject to
the oversight and decisions of local government and the DENR.
This means that mining interests remain a large threat to effective
tenure security. Implementation and enforcement of the act is also
thought to be slow and requires considerable political clout at the
local and national levels. There is also a lack of organizational infra-
structure and specific enabling rules within the governmental agencies
responsible for interacting with indigenous communities. In addition,
many believe that helping communities make profitable use of the
resources they do control is a neglected, but emerging, issue of
importance.
Donors played an important role in the long road to obtaining
passage of the act. Over many years, they funded and supported
many of the public interest law firms, NGOs and indigenous rights
organizations that were at its center. They funded field experiments
and learning activities for mapping and concession management.
They also sponsored influential research, evaluations, and consul-
tancies that signaled to government the importance of social justice
for indigenous communities. 
Sources: Perrot-Maître, 2001; Government of Philippines, 1996; Bennagen and Royo, 2000, “The Ford Foundation
in the Philippines;” - interviews with Gary Hawes, Owen Lynch, LRC-KSK Direct Legal Services Team, and Marvic
Leonen. “Time Line and Summary Drivers for the Philippines Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act.”
CASE 5: South Africa’s Communal 
Associations Act of 1996 
By Lynn Ellsworth and Danièle Perrot-Maître
Forest Tenure in South Africa. The post-apartheid government
of South Africa faced daunting problems with providing tenure security
for South Africa’s poor, a goal proclaimed in the country’s constitution.
So called communal property systems, where they existed at all, had
long been exposed to market and political influence from the wider
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world. After the fall of the apartheid regime, informal renting and
trading of land was commonplace. Moreover, the role of traditional
authorities was quite different than it had been in the 19th century.
These facts meant the communal property systems neither resembled
nor functioned like those systems that anthropologists and legal
scholars had once described. 
Artificial homelands had also been created everywhere in South
Africa, and thousands of people were grouped into them.
Overcrowding was typical in some regions. Violent evictions from
“white” lands had taken place, and “nature reserves” had been
declared in areas previously viewed as a managed commons. Many
people lived as refugee guests on the lands of another “tribe”—a word
that was starting to fail in meaning. Competing claims to land were,
and remain, a thorny problem. To make matters even more compli-
cated, the migratory character of the labor market in South Africa
made defining a member of any given “community” or “tribe” an
insolvable puzzle. In sum, the sheer number of people with potentially
valid land claims meant that accommodating them all was a vast task.
These are only some of the difficulties and complexities presented, all
of which shrink as obstacles before the appallingly unequal distribution
of land ownership between whites and blacks, a great wrong stemming
from South Africa’s apartheid heritage.
The Process of Tenure Reform for Indigenous Forest
Rights. With the political arrival to power of the African National
Congress (ANC) and the contributions of international donors to the
country’s finances, policy change was in the air. A period of optimism
and a lively debate ensued about what should be done and how it
should be financed. Scholars with sympathy to the common property
school of thought (see “A Place in the World” in this publication
series) influenced this policy discussion by urging diverse property
rights and legal legitimacy for group land ownership. One of many
outcomes from that initial period of policy change was the passage of
the Communal Property Associations Act of 1996. It allowed groups
to constitute themselves as associations and to create trusts with duly
elected boards of directors and officers. Group title can then be granted
to such trusts. This is a remarkable achievement.
While in theory this was a simple way to accommodate the great
diversity of tenure situations, in practice, implementation of the act
has been difficult and success has so far been rare. However, this is not
suggest that the act was not needed. Interestingly, implementation
difficulties have led reformers to propose ancillary changes to many
different laws as well as organizational changes for the different levels
of government. The aim of these changes is to allow government to
interact better with land trusts and claimant groups in order to offer
adequate policy and service support to the “new” landowners. But a
primary difficulty with implementation has been the fact that groups
seeking land claims through this form of tenure are unfamiliar with
the Anglo-Saxon notion of trusts and with the managerial system
involving boards of directors. Moreover, the trust solution does not
systematically mesh well with the “traditional” systems as they have
evolved over time. One researcher reports that trusts offer
“inequitable allocation of assets based on self-help, the squandering
of opportunity; a disregard for internal rules; ... with infrastructure
and land being left to deteriorate” as well as “failure to follow open
and transparent tender procedures. These problems appear to exist
regardless of group size.” (Pienaar, p. 329). 
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Looking Forward, Future Challenges. In addition to
problems with implementation of the Communal Property
Associations Act of 1996, the larger issue of land reform in South
Africa has been mired in internal debate. One discussion revives the
1930s and 1950s controversy throughout East and Southern Africa
about the role of the middle-class yeoman or “commercial” farmer as a
favored beneficiary of land redistribution and individualized property
rights. So, despite legislative innovation, the character of land reform
in South Africa still is uncertain. One lesson here may be simply that
de jure changes must be accompanied by substantial resources to assure
implementation and viable field models of success.
Sources: Cousins, 1999; Adams, 2001; Adams et al., 1999; Ainslee, 2000; Government of South Africa, 1996;
Perrot-Maître, 2001.
CASE 6: Bolivia’s Move Toward Multicultural
Democracy: Legal Reforms Strengthening 
Community-based Tenure and Governance 
of Forest Resources 
By Forest Trends Staff
Forest Tenure in Bolivia. Bolivia is a multicultural society
where indigenous people compose 70 percent of the population.
Almost half of the country is covered by forests. During the past
decade, social movements have brought radical reforms to Bolivia
with the stated purpose of putting the government under the control
of the people. These reforms reduced the powers of the president and
governmental ministers, creating a robust framework that provides
multiple avenues for grassroots political action to achieve full imple-
mentation of community property rights. Reforms have been linked
to extensive public awareness-raising campaigns to inform citizens
about exercising their rights. 
A Timeline of Events and Implications. 
1953: Following the National Revolution, which destroyed the
hacienda system in the highlands, a coalition of miners and highland
indigenous communities benefited from the 1953 Agrarian Reform
Law. The law returned lands to indigenous peoples of the Andes.
However, the indigenous territories of the lowlands were left open
for colonization, logging, and ranch expansion. The law recognized
collective property rights. Two different state agencies registered
land titles, creating confusion. Land rights did not include rights
over forests, subsoil minerals or petroleum. 
1980: Indigenous lowlands peoples began to organize with assistance
from APCOB, an NGO dedicated to supporting the rights of indigenous
peoples. The Guaraní of Izozog in the Chaco, with their strong tradi-
tions of self-governance, provided an anchor for the new movement.
1984: Confederación de Indígenos del Oriente Boliviano, or
Confederation of the Indigenous Peoples of Eastern Bolivia
(CIDOB), was founded under the leadership of Bonifacio Barrientos,
Capitán Grande of Izozog. CIDOB began as a confederation of
Guaraní, Chiquitano and Ayoredoe peoples. CIDOB then joined
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COICA—the federation of pan-Amazonian indigenous peoples.
CIDOB had a pan-indigenous identity and eventually included repre-
sentatives of indigenous organizations from all of the Bolivian lowlands
departments. CIDOB includes a grand assembly of 300 representatives
from  34 lowland indigenous groups, and a group of directors that
coordinate closely with regional organizations (CABI, CICC,
CICOL, CPIB, CIDDEBENI, CPIOAP,CIPITCO, CPILAP, etc.)
and to respond to local community assemblies. The directors’ role is
to represent peoples’ interests and reach out to donors, NGOs, con-
sultants and others to keep base constituents informed. CIDOB does
not make decisions, but rather negotiates on behalf of its constituency.
1986: The community of San Antonio de Lomerío initiated the
first indigenous forestry project – basically a sawmill operation – on its
community lands with assistance from APCOB. But the state refused
to legalize the sawmill. Management plans were made so community-
based logging could compete and resist state-awarded forestry conces-
sions until 1996, when the forest first became certified. Over the
decade, APCOB, CICOL and communities of San Antonio Lomerio
adjusted their forestry and financial management approach to fit com-
munities’ culture and expectations. 
1990: The March for Land and Dignity took place. Led by Central
de Pueblos Indígenos del Beni (CPIB) and supported by CIDOB, 600
indigenous people from Beni marched 800 kilometers from lowlands
to the high altitudes of La Paz to demand recognition of indigenous
land claims. The dramatic march was covered by media and achieved
public awareness for Bolivia’s lowland peoples as citizens seeking their
property rights. In response, the president signed “Supreme Decree
22611,” which created four “Multiethnic Indigenous Territories” to be
followed by five more. However, little concrete action resulted from
the decree.
1994: Constitutional reforms laid the framework for real political
change to support nationwide community-based tenure under the
political leadership of President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada with
Aymara Vice President Victor Hugo Cárdenas. The new constitution
recognized the multiethnic and pluricultural nature of Bolivia and
included provisions from ILO 169. Article 171 recognizes and protects
the social, economic and cultural rights of indigenous people, especially
those of the TCO, “guaranteeing the use and sustainable exploitation
of the natural resources, their identity, values, languages, customs
and institutions.”
Popular Participation Law (LPP) was rapidly written by a small
team of professionals with strong grassroots connections and awareness
about rural problems. Taking advantage of political will behind the
Old growth forests are an 
irreplaceable precious resource. 
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movement in late 1993, the law has great legitimacy and helped build
a base for a strong democratic system by:
• creating new local government structures, including municipios
in all parts of the country, a vigilance council to monitor the
functioning of the municipal government and other similar
accountability structures throughout government agencies;
• recognizing all civil associations as legal and not subversive, 
and enabling easy registration; 
• giving indigenous communities legal status so they can take
advantage of rights under laws;
• reorganizing many government bureaucracies to streamline
accountability by reorienting agencies to local demands instead 
of demands from within; 
• shifting revenue and decision-making to municipal governments;
and
• including a strong provision that all laws must conform to LPP and
incorporate popular participation. 
1995: CIDOB established a technical arm, CPTI, which includes a
GIS system to overlay government land-use data with indigenous land
claims and to illustrate threats to indigenous land rights. CIDOB also
analyzed draft laws for potential impact on indigenous land rights. A
decentralization law provided municipal governments with new
resources and powers, establishing a citizens’ vigilance committee to
hold local government accountable. Implementation was uneven.
1996: The March for Territory, Land, Political Rights and
Development took place. It was the second indigenous march to the
capital to demand territorial rights. CIBOB and the rural farmers’
organization, CSUTCB, joined together to protest the draft land
reform bill. CIDOB successfully lobbied to include TCOs (Tierra
Comunitarias de Origen, or Traditional Community Lands) in the
National Agrarian Reform Law, which also was passed in 1996. The
INRA incorporated the nine areas listed in the presidential decree of
1990 and stipulated that 16 other TCOs be granted within ten months’
time. However, the law’s process for creating a TCO was burdensome,
including multiple steps: 1) petition, 2) profiling, 3) mapping, 4)
immobilization, 5) study of the area, 6) legal review of private properties
in area, 7) compensation and 8) titling.
In the same year, a new forestry law created a forest superinten-
dency to provide professional management and accountability for
implementing forest regulations. It empowered local government by
decentralizing decision-making and by allocating forest royalties to
enable municipios to establish and manage their own forests. The
forestry law gives indigenous peoples special rights to exploit forests
on their TCOs and prohibits access of timber companies without
community permission.
San Antonio Lomerio also received the first “green label” in
Bolivia—a first for any South American indigenous community.
Certification was used as strategy to exclude outsiders from indige-
nous forests.
1996-2000: Izozog, Lomerio and Urubichu unilaterally declared
themselves “indigenous municipal governments,” moving forward
their agenda for political semi autonomy. Izozog linked its TCO
claim with support for Kaa Iya National Park and built an alliance
with WCS, an international conservation NGO. The UPAS law was
drafted by the Ministry of Sustainable Development and CIDOB to
recognize the autonomy and special participation of these units, sepa-
rating them from the problems of political parties participating in
local elections. This allowed local governments to focus on local
problems and solidarity for maintaining land rights. Some communities
created “mancomunidades” to serve as representative governments
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spanning several municipalities and controlling the TCO territory
under a single government, rather than fragmented under several
local government administrative units. Another strategy involved
“Unidades de Gestión” to unite TCO under a single government by
redrawing municipal boundaries to coincide with TCO boundaries.
Indigenous communities negotiated with oil companies which
extract oil from their lands with widely varying degrees of success.
Colonists invaded some areas under TCO claims. 
2001: Beni called another march protesting slow action on TCOs
and the president sent emissaries to assure the community that progress
will be made. The developments offer the possibility of a new trust fund,
similar to that already created for rural farmers, which will support
economic, social, cultural and political development for indigenous
people. Implementation of social control of the justice system has
begun, including the role of ombudsman, a constitutional tribunal
and a citizens’ review of sentences with process for resolution of issues. 
Of 20 million hectares put under TCO claims in 1996, only two
million hectares achieved full TCO status by mid-2001. Four of 16
territories mentioned in the law–with promise of being titled within
ten months after its enactment–had been titled. In the same year, the
Izozog TCO land claim was contested by powerful ranch interests.
Looking Forward: Future Challenges. The Bolivian forest
sector policy reform experience is one of the few detailed major exer-
cises in developing countries to rationalize the management of the
country’s forest resources in consonance with wider changes in the
total system of government. Seven million hectares of forests are under
sustainable forest management plans, and now the country is a world
leader in tropical forest certification, with some 800,000 hectares of
forest resources certified. Advances in the institutional field are
remarkable, with the replacement of a corrupt and inefficient public
forest administration by a professional and transparent one.
Significant advances also have occurred in the decentralization and
devolution of responsibilities and decisions about forest resources
management to rural communities. At least 14 enterprises now have
access to some 1.4 million hectares with clear property boundaries and
ownership rights. Notwithstanding, the reform initiative has faced
numerous obstacles. For example, the institutional consolidation of
the superintendence has failed in certain regions; financing is a serious
problem; and issuing of land titles has been slow.
It is hoped that in the future, Bolivia will continue to work
toward implementing this reform, perhaps revising the fee system to
reflect the variety of concessionaires and communities, ensuring
that penalties can be enforced to control the targeted actors, ensuring
that more companies can vertically integrate, making sustainability
more feasible and encouraging continued civil society participation
to inspire effective decentralization. 
Sources: Martinez, 2000. Birk, 2000. Healy, 2001, Kaimowitz et al., 1998. Alcorn field interviews Aug, 2001.
CASE 7. Group Title for Colombia’s Indigenous Peoples
and Afro-Colombians: A Timeline
Forest Tenure in Colombia. There are about 420,000 indigenous
peoples in Colombia spread across 27 administrative departments.48
Since 1990, there has been a movement to guard the rights of indige-
nous peoples to their traditional territories and protect them from
outside settlement and integrationist policies. In 1995, based on
changes to the nation’s constitution, Colombia allowed indigenous
groups and Afro-Colombian communities to register their rights to
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territories they have historically occupied. Titles to land have been
granted by the Colombian Institute for Agrarian Reform (INCORA)
to 404 communities and to the indigenous “cabildos,” or traditional
governing authorities of these territories.49
Course of Events and Implications. This timeline illustrates
the almost random nature of change and the way in which many
elements can coalesce at critical moments from unplanned directions.
In this case, some of the factors include a receptive World Bank mission
infused with the goals of a new operational directive (originally written
to protect the Yanomami in Brazil), a group of activist NGOs repre-
senting the affected communities (which were already aware of their
options and fighting for land rights), an earlier model of success in
their own country and a moment of government willingness to change
after significant changes in its own constitution. 
1880: Law 89 of Colombia passed. It granted indigenous people
the right to create their own form of internal government, known as
Indigenous Councils, and the right to hold property in the form of
resguardos. Resguardos have complete rights of property over their
lands within a specific jurisdiction.
1900-1950s: Most land was a public forest reserve under direct
state administration allocated to companies as huge rubber conces-
sions, sugar cane and banana plantations. This period ended with
expansion of ports on the Pacific coast and finalization of roads and
railroads connecting mountains to the ocean.
1961: Agrarian Reform Law #135 passed. It recognized indige-
nous peoples’ full rights to property in traditionally occupied lands.
1960s-70s: Many new highway and dam projects and big forest
and mineral concessions were proposed.
Late 1960s: INCORA implemented law #135 and titled 73 
resguardos with one million hectares.
1970s: Indigenous communities began to pressure the govern-
ment to convert “reserves” to resguardos.
1980s: A majority of “reserves” were converted to resguardos.
Afro-Colombians began to imitate the success of the indigenous
activist groups with a “reserves-to-resguardos” strategy to secure
claims to land, much of which was forested. During the same period,
Colombia followed a policy of “opening” to foreign investment in
the Pacific Rim frontier. There was a consequent increase in com-
mercial extraction of timber and in agroindustrial operations.
Parallel to this, the main thrust of World Bank policy in Colombia
was promoting private-sector development consistent with the
“opening” goal of the Colombian government.
1985: A Tropical Forest Action Plan was proposed to provide
economic and social benefits of forests for rural populations instead
of for large companies only.
1988: Regional Autonomous Corporation of Choco signed
“accord 20” granting an indigenous group (ACIA) 800,000 hectares
of land in a nonbinding, unofficial agreement that became a district
model of success.
1990: Indigenous people, mobilized by protests against the cele-
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bration of the 500th anniversary of Columbus, worked to elect two
delegates to the national Constituent Assembly. A coalition of
Afro-Colombian and indigenous groups was created to lobby for
constitutional changes. The most influential Afro-Colombian
group that emerged was El Movimiento Nacional Cimarrón.
1991: Significant changes were made to the constitution. Under the
changes, Colombia recognized ethnicity as part of the Colombian state
and created the possibility of collective territorial rights for ethnic
groups. In the same year, the World Bank developed an operational
directive to protect the interests of indigenous groups, an outcome of the
international outcry over the tragic situation of the Yanomami people
of Brazil.
1992: In Yanaconas, Colombia, the World Bank project review
team, with the above-mentioned operational directive in mind, met
with communities to explain a new land-titling initiative within a
proposed natural resource management project. Indigenous and
Afro-Colombia groups rallied at the meeting to demand collective
title rather than individualized title. The tactic was effective and the
National Planning Authority agreed to guarantee the articulation of
“Transitory Article 55” giving Afro-Colombians collective rights to
territory. The World Bank project was modified to add regional com-
mittees and a “policy and strategy development” component
designed to find a way to help make group title a reality.
1993: The Agrarian Law #70 passed. It guaranteed Afro-
Colombians collective rights to territory. In the same year, a World
Bank appraisal mission proposed that land rights be clarified. The
loan for the natural resource management project proposed the previous
year was approved, and the titling process for groups began.
June 2000: Thirty-seven collective titles for black communities
were created, affecting 1.6 million hectares and 17,770 families.
Looking Forward, Future Challenges. Colombia’s model
provides a number of interesting lessons for countries with similar pop-
ulations. The reform has been most effective in the lowlands and in
places where overlaps between protected areas and indigenous territories
provide double protection against settlement pressures from outsiders.
The upland areas continue to face challenges from ranchers, farmers
and the government; and INCORA has not had the capability to
demarcate and address conflicts over land rights. The recognition of
Afro-Colombian collective property rights is being mirrored in other
countries, such as Honduras, with increasing acceptance by the sur-
rounding society. Basing legal change on a new constitution provides
clear legitimacy for implementing the reform in a consistent manner.
Case Abstracted from Ng’weno, 2000.
CASE 8: Nepal’s Forestry Law of 1993 
Changes Property Rights: A Timeline
Forest Tenure in Nepal. Despite a long relationship between
local communities and the forests surrounding their agricultural set-
tlements, the Nepali government historically appropriated all forest
lands as public property. In so doing, it kept discretionary control over
all forest products and management decisions. Then, formal legal
devolution of rights began in 1957. It was a process of restoring local
management institutions and systems, even under increasing land
pressure from a rapidly growing population. But tenure reform did not
clearly establish the rights of community and user groups to forest
products. And recently the parliament tried to pass laws re-establishing
strong government control. This step was fought by newly emerged
associations of forest user groups. There is strong support within the
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government to continue the decentralization process, despite com-
mercial interests’ position against this.
Course of Events and Implications. Events in Nepal illus-
trate (as do other cases) that an innovative legal framework can remain
hard to implement. It will stay under threat from those who oppose it.
Despite efforts to organize forest user groups at the federal level, Nepal’s
forest user groups remain politically weak. Legal changes are part of a
longer-term, bigger struggle for security. Although many people triv-
ialize the changes in Nepal, pointing out how they did not bring the
desired effect, many say that legal changes such as the Nepalese Forest
Act can provide a tool that active communities can benefit from until
a different political climate emerges.
Prior to 1957: Most forests were managed under a welter of
indigenous common property systems, some of which were more
effective than others at sustainable use of the timber.
1957: The Private Forests Nationalization Act brought forests
under government jurisdiction.
1961: The Forest Act passed with various amendments to the
1957 version, none of which substantially affected forest national-
ization. 
1967: The Forest Protection and Special Arrangement Act also
amended, without substantially changing the 1957 situation.
1976: The National Forestry Action Plan was laid out, but only
partly implemented.
1978: The government set forth the “Panchayat Forest Rules”
and “Panchayat Protected Forest Rules” to try to reverse deforesta-
tion resulting from the nationalization of forests in 1957. This
allowed local Panchayats to create a management plan and take over
some of the management of their forests. Despite the new rules,
implementation emphasized replanting trees. At the same time, the
World Bank paid for a community forestry project in 29 hill districts,
eventually expanded to an additional 14 districts.
1965-1979: Nepal experienced a loss of 38,000 hectares of forest
cover. Landlessness and the government’s inability to enforce size
limits on earlier land reforms forced landless people more and more
into the hills in search of places to live and cultivate.
1980: The Panchayat Rules were amended again to include more
community forestry concepts, but implementation continued to
emphasize replanting.
1987: The first “National Community Forestry Workshop” was
held with forest department and project staff. Significant donor support
for reform was expressed.
1988: A master plan for the forestry sector was completed, pro-
posing complete overhauls of the forestry acts. Reformers proposed
that forest user groups should have greater rights over forests,
emphasizing the need for massive retraining of the entire staff of the
ministry to allow for user-group management of forests.
1990: New “Forestry Development Rules” and “Leasehold
Forestry Rules” were enacted and the Forestry Bill of 1990 passed.
Innovative and consistent with the recommendations of the master
plan of 1988, the act contains guidelines for handing over forest
management to user groups.
Case Studies
There is strong support within the government 
in Nepal to continue the decentralization process,
despite commercial interests’ position against this.
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1993: The Forest Act of 1993 formally enshrined the concepts of
user group and community forestry in law. District officers became
able to hand over any part of the national forest to a user group for
conservation, use and management. Communities were able to sell
and distribute their forest products.
1998: About 4,466 user groups were legally recognized and
293,000 hectares of national forest were handed over. While the Forest
Act was seen as a great innovation, implementation was difficult due to
the weak ability of the forest departments to build managerial capacity
within user groups, as well as to distrust of government, inadequate
financing, increased local disputes about benefit sharing, and leader-
ship and actual membership problems in some of the groups.
2001: Proposed amendments to the Forest Act were designed to
return land to control of the forestry department and require user groups
to give away 65 percent of their earnings to the government. Widely
seen as an attack on the act, the proposed provisions also called for
giving forest areas to foreign concessions. The search for more govern-
ment revenue was the primary drive behind the proposed amendments.
Looking Forward, Future Challenges. The debate on the
respective rights of the nation and forest users continues, particularly in 
the lowland of Terai where the commercial interests are greatest. 
Nepal is an interesting case because of the diverse use of the forest
resource—to support agriculture, for timber and nontimber products,
and to protect water sources and provide other environmental services.
Experiments in different parts of Nepal are designed to strengthen
local institutions and associations for communities and user groups.
The focus also includes maximizing returns to forest users, in the form
of cash income, new enterprises and subsistence products. 
Despite the recent policy changes by the government, Nepal
continues to be a model for other countries in South Asia who have
not handed over as many management rights. A remaining challenge
for forest user groups is to organize and prevent the government from 
re-establishing its control over forests now that therse have increased
in value thanks to the communities investments. 
Sources: Forest and Communities.org; Mahapatra, 2001; Shrestha, 1998; Shrestha, 1999; and Britt, 1998.
CASE 9: 
Tanzanian Land Policy Inspired by Models of Success
Forest Tenure in Tanzania. Tanzania is the southernmost
country in East Africa, with a rich forest estate providing a variety of
products and services, including fuelwood and numerous nontimber
forest products, and more recently tourism resources. These forests are
under considerable pressure for conversion to other uses and because of
repeated forest fires. Since 1995, more than 1,000 village forest reserves
have been created by communities, and more than 40 national forest
reserves are coming under working co-management arrangements.50
Course of Events and Implications. 1970-early 1990s:
Tanzania’s forest management model followed a typical Southeast
African approach. In this classic African situation, most land was
considered public property. A government forest bureaucracy sometimes
zoned public land and declared it protected or conservation land,
regardless of community claims or customary use rights. Community
involvement in forest management was limited to occasional efforts
to protect forests, replant, or make ill-managed community woodlots.
Unique to Tanzania, however, was the presence of artificially created
“villages” from Tanzania’s years of experimentation with socialism.
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These villages were given strong legal rights. The villages have village
councils– elected and recognized as legal entities in Tanzanian law. The
councils can hold property, sue and conduct legal transactions. Village
councils can also zone village-owned land as common land. The
notion of the village as a legal governance entity is rare in Africa, as
villages are usually part of territory administered in the colonial tradition
by a central government.
1984: Duru-Haitemba forest was proposed for gazettement as a
forest reserve. The bylaws of the affected district declared the area
protected, meaning local people could no longer use it or harvest
timber. However, implementation of these rules did not take place. 
1989: A discussion on the need for widespread legal tenure
reform began within ministries and among experts and donors working
in Tanzania. This resulted in the creation of a technical committee
in the Ministry of Lands to look into urban land policy.
1991: The urban land policy commission was expanded to look
into national land policy. A 12-member commission of inquiry traveled
throughout the country to carry out its investigations.
1991-1992: Government forestry agents cleared the Duru-
Haitemba Forest boundaries and installed beacons. Affected village
residents reacted with “resistance” (the nature of this resistance was
not specified in documents consulted). External arbitration was
sought. The arbitrator suggested that the government trade forest use
rights for the “taking” of public land and its classification as a protected
forest. Negotiations with affected villages halted reclassification of
the land, and discussions continued for several years.
1993: The Land Commission of 1991 made its report with no
support from the government. A position paper drawn up by the
ministry eventually was based on the commission’s report. No public
consultation on land tenure issues occurred.
1994: The forest land of Duru-Haitemba was returned to the
affected villages with recognized village title deeds. This solution was
“discovered” in part because the affected villages were being sup-
ported by a donor project to survey and demarcate village areas at
the same time the dispute over the Duru-Haitemba forest took place.
In the resulting agreement, each village zoned its part of the forest
and closed some areas for restoration. Management rules were set up.
After a local magistrate ruled against some villages on some manage-
ment issues, the affected villages instituted village bylaws to clarify
forest management rules.
1995: All 9,000 hectares of the Duru-Haitemba forest were under
the management of the affected villages. A National Land Policy
was approved in Parliament.
Since 1995: Duru-Haitemba forest management rules were con-
tinually modified and updated in incremental, local problem-solving
arrangements.
1995-1998: Five villages around the Mgori forest in a different
region followed the earlier model discovered at Duru-Haitemba. 
1996: A draft bill for a new Land Act was prepared by a British
government-funded expatriate consultant. This angers members of
the earlier land commission. The consultant’s Draft Land Act was
not circulated.
1998: Very limited public discussion took place and the proposed
Case Studies
Unique to Tanzania was the presence of artificially
created “villages” from Tanzania’s years 
of experimentation with socialism. 
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Land Act was finally allowed at the end of the calendar year. Local
academics praised the bill for giving attention to the security needs
of women and squatters, the village administration concept, the
acceptance of commonages and the recognition of customary law.
However, the bill was criticized for continuing to require govern-
ment approval for nearly every step and every local change. 
1999: Village Land Act #5 and the Land Act #4 were both quickly
enacted in February with full support of Parliament. These laws
divided Tanzania into village land, reserved land, and government
land. Customary land law was also recognized. The laws provided for
adjudicating, recording, registering and issuing titles for customary
rights. Village councils managed village lands. Commonage also was
accepted as a legitimate type of land.
2000: A new draft Forestry Bill was designed to add community
forests as a type of forest classification. Cumbersome regulations for
establishing community forests limited expansion of the Mgori and
Duru-Haitemba models. The Land Acts of 1999 came to be seen as
extremely difficult to implement due to lack of political will within
the affected ministries. The ministry of Lands claimed the new Land
Acts would require decades to implement. Experts on the scene
questioned whether the Ministry would bother advising villages on
using the act for community benefit or simply would ignore the new
laws and continue Top-down land management and “business as usual.”
The timeline of this case illustrates the usefulness of successful
field experiments and how they get the attention they need when
national reform emerges as a possibility. It also shows the limitations
of many worthy “top-down” changes promoted by donors, as well as
the limitations of change through models without strong civil society
associations. Top-down reforms can provide necessary legislative
framework, but bottom-up activism and a dense network of civic
organizations and interest groups may be necessary to make the
changes operational and to make them stick over time. Tanzania is
also an unusual case in its region, in terms of communities’ strength
with registration and the rights to elect their own local governments
in the form of the village council. As the decentralization process
unfolds in Africa, Tanzania will provide interesting lessons on the
role of governance in effective forest management.
Sources: Palmer, Wiley, and Adams, 2000; Wiley and Dewees, 2001; Wiley, 2000.
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